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Abstract 
 
 
Labour market mobility among senior workers in Norway 
by 
Anne Marte Lunde Tobro, Master in Economics 
University of Bergen, 2015 
Supervisors: Astrid Louise Grasdal og Alf Erling Risa  
 
 
As many developed countries, Norway has a growing elderly population and need to 
administer some policy change to cover the cost of the increasing number of pension 
recipients. One of the solutions to this problem is to give workers incentive to stay in the 
workforce longer. This thesis analyse the senior workers labour market mobility by studying 
the probability of leaving the workforce and the probability for senior workers to conduct a 
job change. Understanding job-to-nonemployment and job-to-job mobility give valuable 
information on the development of the labour market for senior workers, and with this 
information it is possible to better facilitate policy incentives. 
 
Nonemployment and job-to-job mobility are both represented as binary variables in this 
thesis, and I have chosen to use the logit model to calculate the probabilities. The results from 
the probability of leaving the workforce conforms to the theory and show that lower educated 
individuals have a higher probability of leaving early. The probability of job change does also 
decline with age, but the age coefficients have a curvilinear shape. The probability of job 
change increase before declining, and this is more difficult to explain.  
 
STATA 13.1 is the software used for the regression analysis and most graphical figures, 
EndNote has been used for sorting references and the Microsoft Office package for text, 
tables and the remaining figures. 
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1. Introduction 
The demographic pyramids of the western world are changing from a triangular to a more 
rectangular shape. As the numerous baby-boomers grow older, a shift will occur in the 
structure of the workforce, the superior numbers of the working population dwindles while 
the ratio receiving pensions will increase. The generation now entering the workforce are few 
and they will carry a heavy load, supporting both a large elderly population and an almost 
equally large young portion in school. As of 2013 there were 800 350 recipients of 
governmental retirement benefits from the National insurance scheme (NIS) (Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå, 2014a), and as of 2012 21 per cent of the population were more than 60 years old 
and this share will increase to 27 per cent the next thirty years (Haga, 2014). 
 
The pension scheme in Norway is a “pay as you go” system, so the people currently in the 
workforce are the ones to cover the cost of pensions paid out now. With a diminishing ratio of 
working individuals this can create a financial gap. There are four typical ways to resolve the 
issue: I) Postpone the problem, plan for higher taxes in the future, II) pre-fund, by building up 
assets, III) Try to reduce government expenditure by executing pension reforms and 
preventive measures for better health in the population (and thus reducing costs in the health 
sector), and IV) raise future output enough to cover the cost (Bellone and Bibbee, 2006). 
Option one is not very good since it might stagnate future growth. Norway have a better 
chance at managing option II) than other countries because of the Government Pension Fund 
Global. Despite the name the fund is not an actual pension fund, and it is never good to keep 
paying on an unsustainable system anyway. The fourth option is one that every country 
should try to accomplish regardless of a specific challenge. Theoretically increased efficiency 
would be sufficient to increase output, but there is a risk that the efficiency will not go up fast 
enough for the permanent change in the ratio between working population and those in need 
of welfare support. That leaves the third option; execute pension and health reforms trying to 
reduce the cost. The aim is to get the expenses on a level where the current working 
population are able to cover the cost. One way for the state to approach both solutions is to 
give people incentives to stay in the workforce longer.  
 
In 2011 a pension reform was implemented, among other things this reform aims to give 
people incentives to work longer. With Prop. 48 L (2014-2015) the government wants to 
facilitate for senior workers to continue working longer. One selected approach is to go 
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through all statutory age limits in the workforce. Current legislations give employers mandate 
to terminate an employment contract based on age when a worker turns 70 (or 67 if specified 
in employment contract at the beginning of the job spell). The government propose to extend 
this age limit to 72 (and 70). In Prop. 48 L (2014-2015) the government argues that an 
increase in mandatory retirement age will increase economic growth by allowing more people 
to work longer. Edward Lazear’s (1979) theory on wage profiles gives another view on the 
matter of mandatory retirement age. Giving people incentives to stay in the workforce might 
create a conflict of interest between the state and the private businesses. The state naturally 
wants to diminish the expected expenses induced by a large group approaching retirement, but 
the private sector is not necessarily interested in hiring senior workers (Daniel and Heywood, 
2007, Hutchens, 1986). Senior workers have through experience accumulated general human 
capital and usually wages increase to match these investments (Mincer, 1970, Mincer, 1997), 
but at some point the rate of accumulation flattens and then the productivity starts to decline 
with age (Skirbekk, 2004). 
 
As productivity is reduced, but the wage stays the same, we get an increasing gap between 
productivity and wage level. Lazear’s theory tells that an implicit contract between employers 
and employees, this contract lets individuals entering the workforce work with wages lower 
than productivity, so as their career progress wages will increase. Continuous increasing 
wages creates incentive to keep efforts high, and not shirk or leave. When the worker get 
older and the gap between productivity and wage increase there is no need to lower the wage 
level because this gap is already “paid for” by high productivity early in the career. However; 
for the contract to function it demands an end date, the mandatory retirement date.  
 
The policy makers wish to give people incentives to continue working longer, but to manage 
this it is important to understand the foundation of the senior workers labour market mobility. 
I will make use of the knowledge of the productivity/wage gap, and why this demands a 
mandatory retirement age, to study the mobility of senior workers in the labour market. The 
workers are affected by Lazear’s implicit contract by varying degree, and to identify the 
differences I will break down job mobility into two main aspects; mobility out of the 
workforce (job-to-nonemployment) and mobility between jobs (job-to-job). I will study the 
probability of mobility for individuals with different background characteristics.  
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It is already known that most leave the workforce before the retirement age at 67. Figure 1 
below show the workforce allocated into 5 different groups, and only a glance at the figure 
confirms this statement. The figure also shows the rapid growth in elderly population that will 
take place in the next few years. In this thesis I will study the labour market mobility in the 
years before the retirement age.  
 
Figure 1: Activity allocation of the sample population, by age. Cross section of year 
2005.  Frequency 
 
Birth year:     1955                1946            1937 
 
The process of facilitating for senior workers is ongoing. The pension reform was 
implemented in 2011, and already there are indications that the reform has been able to 
change the trend (Bråthen and Bakken, 2012). I begin the thesis in chapter 2 by giving a brief 
introduction to the Norwegian pension system, both before and after the reform in 2011. The 
old system will hold the main focus here since it encompasses the individuals in my sample. I 
will still give a short introductions to the principal changes made by the reform and the new 
propositions to the Work Environment Act; Prop. 48 L (2014-2015) and Prop. 39 L (2014-
2015).  
 
In chapter 3 I will follow up with several general theories addressing labour market mobility. 
Lazear’s discussion on the necessity of mandatory retirement age, and the implicit contract 
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between employer and employee will get most attention. I will also summarize empirical 
work done on different aspects of the theories.  
 
There is little scientific work done on labour mobility among senior workers in Norway. In 
chapter 4 I will present two different empirical studies I have found on the topic: The first 
study (by Bråthen and Bakken (2012)) focus on the decision of leaving the workforce and the 
factors influencing this decision. The second study is a statistical overview on job-to-job 
mobility among senior workers in Norway by Johansen (2013) at Statistics Norway. The last 
one has proven to be a very good source of reference for the numbers from my own analysis.  
 
Chapter 5 gives an overview of the dataset I use in the empirical analysis. The chapter gives a 
brief note on the origin of the data and a description how the sample was constructed. After 
that follows a more detailed listing of the sample individuals background characteristics and 
information on the explanatory variables. The two independent variables in the thesis will get 
special attention in the next sections with some descriptive statistics and a discussion of 
expected results.  
 
Chapter 6 gives a brief introduction to the econometric theory relevant for the analysis.  
 
Regression results will be presented in chapter 7. The first analysis will focus on job-to-
nonemployment mobility. There I identify who has the largest (or smallest) probability of 
leaving, and looking at the effects by education level and age. Then I will study job-to-job 
mobility by looking at whether an individual has conducted a job change to a new enterprise 
during the last year. Enterprise is a higher classification of firms, and it is less frequent to 
conduct a job change between enterprises (municipality or chain of stores), than between the 
lower classification establishments (school or shop). The theory is that mobility within an 
enterprise will not affect pension and security, while shifting to a new enterprise might. In 
general I expect the both the probability of exiting the workforce and the probability of 
between job mobility to decrease with age. 
 
The thesis is concluded with a summary discussion in chapter 8. 
The Norwegian National retirement programme 
5 
2. The Norwegian National retirement programme 
The last decades several OECD countries, included Norway, have conducted reforms of their 
pension programmes. All the Western European countries face a common challenge, the 
increasing portion of ageing population. To keep fiscal sustainability; many OECD countries 
have, or  need to, reform their pension programmes (Arbeidsdepartementet, 2007). Norway 
might be in a better position than most because of the petroleum fund, but the current system 
is still far from sustainable (Bellone and Bibbee, 2006). 
 
The working participation rate is high, but this also imply that a great number of people earn 
the right to full pensions, and the ratio paying for this system will decrease in the years to 
come. With a continuance of the old pension programme, the expenses to pensions from the 
National Insurance scheme would raise form 6 per cent of GDP (mainland) to 14 per cent in 
2050 (Arbeidsdepartementet, 2013a), and that is only part of the costs with an ageing 
population. The state can also expect large increase in expenses to the health sector, 
retirement homes etc.  
 
The individuals in the dataset I use in the empirical section are all members of the old pension 
scheme and follow the rules applicable before the reform, so the pension programme before 
the provisions are most relevant to this paper. I describe some of the reform’s key points 
despite of this, to shed light on actions already undertaken by the government to make the 
programme more sustainable by giving better incentives to stay in the workforce. 
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2.1. The Norwegian pension programme 1967-2010 
2.1.1. A small summary on retirement age 
There are many different rights concerning retirement benefit and retirement age. To clear up 
some possible confusion I have included small table summarizing the general rules regarding 
retirement age in the old system. 
 
Table 1: Retirement age  
<62 
Some professions have the option of early retirement before 62 years. This 
usually concerns jobs with demanding physical- or hazardous work such as 
police and fire department.  
62-67 
This is called the flexible retirement age before age 67 (AFP). This option 
was intended as an alternative to disability benefit to individuals who are 
tired of working. The pension is calculated as if the person had continued 
working to 67. 
67 
This is the formal retirement age; at 67 any employee has the right to retire. 
According to the source it is anticipated that all individuals with normal 
health work until this age. 
67-70 
This is called the flexible retirement age. It is still possible to earn 
retirement points until you are 70 years old.  
70 
When the individual turns 70 the employer has the right by law to dismiss 
an employee based on his/her age.  
Source: (NOU 2004: 1, 2004) 
 
The official retirement age is set to 67 years; this is actually already high compared to many 
other European countries. But because of generous early retirement schemes and other 
national insurances, the actual effective age of labour market exit reached a low of 59-60 in 
2004 (Bellone and Bibbee, 2006).  
2.1.2. A threefold payment 
The total of accumulated pension can be divided into three parts. As in many policies some of 
the main objectives in the pension programme are to strive for gender- and income equality. 
Nevertheless the pension is also going to reflect how much a person have worked and earned 
before retiring. The payment can be considered threefold: A basic pension, supplementary 
pension and in some cases a special supplement. All of the benefits are calculated using a 
basic amount (B.a.) that is adjusted annually by the parliament. The adjustment is in relation 
to cost of living and the general income level and per May 2014 one B.a. is NOK 88 370 
(Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration, 2014). The pension will be adjusted 
according to the time of drawing and whether it is drawn fully or partly.  
The Norwegian National retirement programme 
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Everyone have a right to the basic pension equal to 1 B.a., though this is not the minimum 
pension level, but the reminder of this amount is calculated with either the supplementary 
pension, the special pension or both. The minimum pension is typically 2 B.a.  
 
One of the schemes aim is to maintain the standard of living that the recipient is accustomed 
to, and to accomplish this income based supplementary pension is added. This pension is 
calculated based on annual income and years in the workforce. To get full pension the 
recipient must have worked 40 years (thus earning the required pension points), any less than 
that and the pension will be reduced accordingly. The number of pension points earned when 
working decides the final payment and the points are calculated from pensionable income, 
though only up to a point. The first 6 B.a. gives full coverage (in B.a. 2014 this amount equals 
gross wage of NOK 530 220), but the next 6 only get 1/3 coverage. The National Insurance 
Scheme does not cover any wage above 12 B.a. (NOK 1 060 440 in 2014). 
 
Pensionable income:    (𝑋 ∗ 𝐵. 𝑎) + (
1
3
𝑌 ∗ 𝐵. 𝑎. ) 
Where X is the number of B.a. the gross wage adds up to within the interval [0,6], and Y is 
the number of B.a. the income adds up to in the interval  <6,12]. 
 
Calculation of supplementary pension:  
Pension points: 𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 − 𝐵. 𝑎
𝐵. 𝑎
 
 
Final pension points: Average of the 20 best income years  
Supplementary pension: 𝐵. 𝑎.× 𝐹𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠
× 𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑔𝑒1 
 
 
The third type of payment is the special supplement; this is targeted to those who have no or 
little supplementary pension (less than 20 years of work to earn pension points). The special 
supplement is there to cover the gap between the minimum pension and the B.a. Some have 
earned a little supplementary pension and the special addition is truncated against the earned 
amount. In 2006, 88 per cent of those with minimum pension were women 
(Arbeidsdepartementet, 2007) and the largest group receiving special supplement are typically 
                                                 
1
 The full annual basic supplementary pension is now set at 42 per cent; it was last changed in 1992 and was 45 
per cent prior to that year. 
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widowed housewives. There are special provisions regarding married couples, people taking 
care of young children, the disabled and sick.  
2.2. Short about the pension reform, Prop. 48 L (2014-2015) and Prop. 39 
L (2014-2015) 
From 2011 the new provisions came into effect. The most important change in the programme 
is that the payments now will to a larger degree reflect how many years a person will spend as 
retired and total work-related income. These changes introduce better incentives to work more 
over the course of working life. 
 
It was decided that you could start receiving pension already from age 62, both in 
combination without or with work, still earning points while also receiving pension money. 
The amount paid out will be adjusted for age when the payment start and the current life 
expectancy for the recipients age group, all making it more attractive to continue working. 
Earlier AFP payment was reduced if combined with work, but this has now been remedied in 
the private sector. Additionally there are new tax regulations increasing the economic 
incentive to continue working (Bråthen and Bakken, 2012). 
 
As mentioned above, with the old provisions the supplementary pension was calculated from 
the 20 best income years, after the reform all working years will be used. The pension is now 
income-based and there are no restrictions based on years in the workforce.  All income up to 
7,1 B.a. earned between age 13 and 75 counts and is used in the calculations. The annual 
pension earnings is equivalent to 18,1 per cent per cent of this income. The National 
Insurance Scheme does not cover any income above that. 
 
In Prop. 48 L (2014-2015) the government propose (among other things) to change some of 
the age limits in the Work Environment Act. The first of these is the age limit where an 
employer can terminate a contract based on the age of the worker. Now an employer has the 
right to terminate a contract when the worker turns 70, with no need of proof of reduced 
productivity than the age of the worker. The government discussed removing the age limit 
entirely or changing it to age 72 or 75. After the official hearing they ended up proposing to 
change the age limit to 72. The second age limit proposed to change is the possible age limit a 
private employer might set in the contract of its employees. As of now a private firm might 
enclose in the contract an age limit down to 67. This is only allowed as long as the age limit is 
The Norwegian National retirement programme 
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universal for all employees in the firm and practiced consistently. The limit must be well 
known by all employees and combined with a satisfactory early retirement program. Prop. 48 
L (2014-2015) suggest that this lower age limit should be raised to 70 instead for 67. The 
proposition also includes an ambiguous section stating that these changes in legislation should 
not incorporate the “special” age limits in the public sector. This could either mean all public 
sector employees or only those age limits for special positions such as police officers and fire 
fighters.  
 
Prop. 39 L (2014-2015) also suggest changes in the Work Environment Act. This proposition 
is regarding temporary employment. The change suggested is roughly that it should be 
allowed to keep workers in a temporary contract for two years before the employer must offer 
a permanent contract. 
Labour market mobility among senior workers 
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3. Labour market mobility among senior workers 
In this thesis I focus on two different types of labour market mobility; job-to-job mobility and 
job-to-nonemployment mobility. High labour mobility can be advantageous for a country, 
because it is a representation of swiftness in reactions to changes in product demand, which 
can give positive effects of the economic performance (Groot and Verberne 1997). 
 
There are several theories on why mobility should decline with age, theories about human 
capital (Mincer, 1962), mobility cost (Groot and Verberne, 1997), job matching (Jovanovic, 
1979) and an implicit wage development contract between employers and employees. 
(Lazear, 1979).  
 
First I will view mobility from a human capital perspective and the question of productivity. 
An individual’s productivity consists of cognitive abilities, education and job experience. 
General productivity is the part interesting to all employers, while firm specific productivity 
consist of productivity that can only be utilized within one firm. Long tenure can be beneficial 
both for the firm and the workers themselves since longer tenure gives more firm specific 
capital and thus increased productivity within the firm (Becker, 2009). A senior worker with 
long tenure will therefore face a bigger loss of relative productivity than one with shorter 
tenure when changing jobs, and with loss in productivity the worker cannot demand the same 
high wage level at a new job (Mincer, 1962).  
 
The second theory considers the cost of mobility: There are other benefits with long tenure 
than attained abilities, for example job security and advantageous pension programs and 
changing job might remove these benefits. There can be more costs involved with changing 
job than security and pension. For example an actual monetary cost associated with moving to 
a new place or costs of a more psychological nature that follows a new work environment. A 
senior worker has fewer years in the new job to yield utilities that can make paying this cost 
worthwhile (Groot and Verberne, 1997). Aside from the material advantages, a utility aspect 
can also explain staying. Senior workers tend to have more stable relationships with their 
employers, long tenure can suggest that the worker like the present job and do not wish to 
change. 
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The job matching theory looks at the quality of the match between employer and employee. It 
is often impossible to judge this match a prior to the job, but if the match is good the 
employee might expect a bigger payoff ex post. With a good job match the employee will 
want to stay to await the rewards of actual observed productivity, and thus not change jobs 
(Jovanovic, 1979). 
 
The fourth theory on mobility comes from Edward Lazear’s renowned theory on implicit 
contracts between employers and employees. Such a contract involves an increasing wage 
profile steeper than the productivity slope. An individual engaged in an implicit contract with 
a firm will wish to stay with this firm, since the dividend of the implicit contract can only be 
utilised at the later stages of the contract.  
 
All three theories listed above suggest that it is not advantageous for a senior worker with 
tenure to change job, and thus I expect the frequency of job change to decline with age. In the 
dataset used in this analysis I do not have information on the individuals’ firm specific tenure, 
and it is therefore difficult to test both the human capital- and job matching theory directly.  
 
In this chapter I will discuss in more detail Lazear’s theory about the necessity of a mandatory 
retirement age, challenges with asymmetric information on productivity and shape and 
determination of the wage profile. The following sections are mainly from Edward Lazear’s 
paper "Why Is There Mandatory Retirement?" (1979). The model explains how the firm 
choose the mandatory retirement age (T) and the employees wage W*(t) to maximize 
payment subject to the constraint that lifetime earnings should equal lifetime expected value 
of marginal product. 
 
3.1. The determination of the wage profile 
The labour market is not per se a free market and many variables contribute when the wage is 
decided. Had the labour market functioned as a spot market with perfect information, the 
wage would be decided directly by the value of the worker’s productivity, but that is almost 
never the case. In a hypothetical world where the labour market is a spot market, the senior 
workers would have decreasing wage, since productivity decline with ageing (Skirbekk, 
2004). This arrangement would imply that as people grow older the wage would be reduced 
proportional to productivity. But actually it is the other way around; the senior workers 
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usually have the highest wages within their fields. When bargaining for the right wage the 
firm and the employee have contradictory incentives. The assumption is that a profit-
maximizing firm will want to get the work done at minimal costs. The employee on the other 
hand will want to balance his preferred allocation between work and leisure against the 
offered wage (assuming the employee get more utility from leisure than work). Additionally 
the workforce is not homogenous and employees might possess firm specific or general skills 
that enhance their bargaining position. Employees are worth more to a firm if they have 
specific skills; the contract is a reflection of that value and the cost of investing in the workers 
abilities. Lazear (1979) presented the theory explaining how firms and employees design an 
implicit (or explicit) contract ex ante that describes an agreed wage profile throughout a 
workers career. We assume that when entering the contract the employee only care about the 
present value of the total wage, not necessarily the shape of the wage curve. The shape of the 
curve determines at what time during the employee’s career he will receive the bulk of the 
payment agreed upon. The curve representing this amount will not be less than the sum the 
employee is willing to accept (lower bound) and not more than what the firm is willing to pay 
(upper bound). The lower bound, or the minimal wage, an employee will accept for one 
particular job is called the reservation wage.  The worker will choose not to work or retire if 
he has no offer higher than the reservation wage. The upper bound is the maximum amount 
the firm is willing to pay; this amount will not exceed the present value of the employee’s 
productivity.  
 
Figure 2 show the restrictions in the bargaining process. 𝑉∗(𝑡) is the value of the workers 
total marginal productivity during their working life. ?̃?(𝑡) represent the workers reservation 
wage and 𝑊∗(𝑡) is the wage profile. For both parties to agree to the contract the wage profile 
𝑊∗(𝑡) must satisfy: 
 
∫ ?̃?(𝑡)
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡 ≤ ∫ 𝑊∗(𝑡)
𝑇
0
𝑑𝑡 ≤ ∫ 𝑉∗(𝑡) 𝑑𝑡
𝑇
0
 
 
The firm will not hire the worker if wage exceeds the total present value of marginal 
productivity, and the worker will not accept any wage below the present value of his 
reservation wage.  
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Figure 2: Wage and productivity over time 
 
 
3.2. The shape of the wage profile 
When deciding the shape of the wage profile the firm need to overcome the challenge of 
employees shirking. So to keep a continuous high productivity the firm must create incentives 
for the workers not to leave or shirk. If the employee sees that the present value of cheating 
exceeds the cost, he will shirk, and if he is caught cheating the firm will terminate the 
contract. The shape of the wage profile can give such incentives. The wage profile 𝑊∗(𝑡) in 
the figure above pays the worker less than his productivity at time 𝑡 < 𝑡∗ and more than his 
productivity when 𝑡 > 𝑡∗. This makes the worker avoid shirking because the risk of cheating 
is too high. The worker prefers to keep up productivity and thus increase his present value of 
wealth. This is one of the reasons why a spot market would be inefficient when deciding 
wage. When workers are only paid the reservation wage, the benefits of cheating usually 
supersedes the cost (Lazear, 1979).  
 
It is also possible for the firm to cheat in this model. They do that either voluntary or not by 
dismissing workers before the ex-ante agreed time (involuntary dismissal comes in the form 
of bankruptcy). However, the firm have less incentive to cheat because they have a longer 
timeframe than workers, and cheating would make them less attractive to the next generation 
of workers. There are several different wage profiles that give the same present value, but 
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very different incentives. The blue lines in the figure below show some of these possibilities 
(AF, ADGF, AGJK and BHE). 
  
Figure 3: Different possible wage profiles 
 
One possibility is the path BHE, a constant wage lower than the value of marginal product 
during the whole career with a large lump sum received when retiring at time T, or ADGF 
which give the same present value but with a different distribution. No worker will cheat with 
any of these wage profiles. Another alternative with no cheating is to have a profile like AF, 
where wage is increasing at a diminishing rate throughout the career. All three alternatives 
require the worker to allocate his money for the remaining years of life after retiring. This can 
be quite challenging since people (for obvious reasons) do not know their own life span. This 
brings us to a fourth possibility; the curve AGJK which also is the one closest to an average 
wage profile in Norway. This is a wage rate that starts below marginal productivity level but 
is increasing (at a diminishing rate). The reminder of present value will be paid after 
retirement at T, so the worker receives a constant sum, a pension, from T to T’.  
 
It was Lazear (1979) who first discussed the possible reasons behind the form of a typical 
wage profile. To function, the balanced contract like he described had to satisfy both 
employer and employee. His model suggest that a steep age-earning profile will give the 
worker continuous incentive to stay productive and not shirk throughout the career. Firms also 
gain in maintaining low turnover in workers, but in order to keep employees from leaving or 
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shirking they need to have an agreement promising higher payment than the marginal product 
sometime in the future. Thus the employees have both the incentive to keep up productivity 
and not shirk or leave. Unfortunately, as humans age their productivity will decline, this might 
be “stating the obvious”, but even if it is not, much research support this statement (Skirbekk, 
2008). Firms that seek to maximize profits are not interested in employing people with low 
productivity. All wage profiles in Figure 3 gives the worker some degree of incentive to stay 
working with high productivity throughout the contract period and not cheat or shirk. This 
will only work if the contract has an ex ante decided end date. Without such a date it is 
assumed that the workers will want to stay working after T since their wage at that point is 
well above their reservation wage. The ex-ante decided end date is the mandatory retirement 
age and this age is defined as the date the implicit or explicit contract between employer and 
employee ends. At this date there will be some workers who wish to remain with the firm 
because of the high wages even though they agreed to the time in the implicit contract made 
ex ante. The firm on the other hand will not be willing to keep the employee at that wage, and 
need the mandatory retirement age to be able to legally terminate workers that want to stay. 
The mandatory retirement date is therefore a needed consequence of the increasing wage 
profile. Without it the firm would need to pay the worker a wage that made him retire at T 
voluntary and the incentives to not shirk would be gone. Consequently, time T is the date of 
ex post mandatory, but ex ante voluntary, retirement. 
 
3.3. Summary of the theories 
Lazear’s model explains the need of a mandatory retirement age and the need for increasing 
wage profiles. The theory predicts those with wage profiles steeper than productivity is the 
ones to stay in the workforce until mandatory retirement requires them to depart. A steep 
wage profile also makes it less likely for an employee to shirk. These workers will stay 
because the payment they receive at the end of the implicit contract is higher than their 
reservation wage and productivity.  
 
Asymmetric information plays a significant role in the different wage profiles. Jobs that 
require higher education is often more difficult to monitor and it is impossible to measure the 
workers’ productivity, effort or outcome. In more menial jobs, outcome is easier to measure, 
and productivity and effort can be observed and sanctioned. This is why there is more need of 
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an implicit contract for workers where it is difficult to observe effort, typically the higher 
educated individuals. 
 
Research support that more general human capital leads to higher wages (Mincer, 1970, 
Mincer, 1997). General human capital is capital equally worth to all firms. It is expected to 
accumulate with job market experience, then diminish and eventually go down as depreciation 
of skill overcomes investments with age. Wages increase with investments to capture the 
returns of these investments, but will usually stagnate when the skill depreciate (Hek and 
Vuuren, 2011, Ghosh, 2007). The wage profile predicted by Lazear will increase trough the 
career at a diminishing rate and will eventually flatten. The levelling is partially caused by the 
productivity level and partially by firm specific capital. With long tenure in one firm a worker 
get increased firm specific capital. This is human capital that only affect the productivity at 
the firm where the individual is working, and cannot be transferred to another firm (Becker, 
2009). For that reason this firm specific productivity is more valuable to this firm than any 
other. And consequently, with firm specific capital the worker is paid more here than at an 
alternative firm, but less than the marginal output. The worker is in other words; locked to this 
position.  
 
Essentially, the individuals with professions difficult to observe are the highly educated. They 
have the largest gap between productivity and wage, but by the implicit contract their wage 
will stay high until retiring at the mandatory retirement
2
. I therefore expect them to stay 
longer in the workforce and have fewer job changes at the end of the working career. 
 
3.4. Empirical testing of Lazear’s theory 
There are many empirical tests on the connection between wage and productivity. Hek and 
Vuuren (2011) have collected 70 different empirical papers in a literature review, 
summarizing and comparing the different results on this connection Many of the studies’ 
findings conform with the theory to some degree, but there is also a sizeable minority which 
find no proof of a wage-productivity gap (Hek and Vuuren, 2011). 
 
All are faced with the same issue: It is (usually) impossible to measure productivity and effort 
directly. The early empirical work use information on the individual to test the wage profile 
                                                 
2
 Some will of course value leisure higher than pay, or have other reasons for leaving the workforce earlier.  
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without any link to firm productivity.  Later work use matched employer-employee data 
where the productivity of the firm can be measured. The long time frame is another issue 
when testing Lazear’s theory since the wage profile covers the whole span of working years. 
It is rare to get data over that many years, so most papers use age cohorts. Tests on Lazear’s 
theory often try to identify the slope of the wage profile and productivity (Lazear and Moore, 
1984, Hutchens, 1987, Abowd et al., 1999). The difference between pay and productivity is 
highest in those professions where it is difficult to observe effort and productivity (Kotlikoff 
and Gokhale, 1992). This is typically job where high education (or high general human 
capital) is required. A majority of the papers compared by Hek and Vuuren (2011) conforms 
with Lazear’s theory.   
 
It is well established in the literature that productivity decline with age. Skirbekk (2004) have 
summarized literature confirming this statement. And others have studied age cohort more 
closely and found a strong decline in productivity after age 50 (Hægeland et al., 1999, Grund 
and Westergård-Nielsen, 2008, Dostie, 2006). However; An empirical study by Lallemand 
and Rycx (2009) on Belgium firms found that younger workers are more productive, but that 
the age structure effect have decreased over time.  
 
Other studies are testing job-matching theory (Becker, 2009, Mincer, 1962). Barth (1997) 
found that those with high level of firm specific knowledge have less steep wage profiles. 
Parsons (1975), Mincer and Jovanovic (1982) found that the probability of separation declines 
with labour market experience and firm specific seniority. But when controlling for wage the 
relationship between the probability of separation and experience is positive (Topel and Ward, 
1992).  
 
Hek and Vuuren (2011) found it to be well established in the literature that employers are 
reluctant to hire senior workers (Hutchens, 1986, Daniel and Heywood, 2007). Employers are 
also more reluctant to invest in training for older workers since they have a shorter amount of 
time to reap the benefits from the investment (Brooke, 2003, Prskawetz and der 
Wissenschaften, 2006).  
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And more directly related to my topic, it has been found that the probability of job change is 
decrease with experience (Ghosh, 2007). The United Kingdom have a different pension 
system, and McCormick and Hughes (1984) found that individuals part of an occupational 
pension program have reduced probability of mobility. And similar results have been found in 
the USA; individuals in pension covered jobs have a lower level of job turnover than others 
(Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993).  
 
Testing Lazear’s theory is a vast process, and complex data is required to manage a measure 
on productivity. As described above, there are already many empirical studies done on the 
productivity/wage gap, but I will focus on the consequences of such a gap on labour market 
mobility among senior workers through studying the probability of leaving and the probability 
of job change.  
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4. Existing literature on labour market mobility among senior workers in 
Norway 
There is not much literature on senior workers mobility in either domestic or international 
publications. In this chapter I will present in detail two empirical studies on mobility in 
Norway, one concerning the decision of leaving the workforce and one on job-to-job mobility.  
 
There is more literature about the why/when senior workers depart the labour market than 
literature on job change. For this chapter I have chosen to present “Work or pension?” by 
Bråthen and Bakken (2012), but there are many other examples and lately especially studies 
concerning early effects of the pension  reform. An example of this is Haga (2014) who 
looked at the development in expected retirement age. He finds that after the pension reform 
in 2011 workers are expected to leave the workforce one year earlier than before. Much of 
this decline is due to an increase in number with disability pensions, but the introduction of 
the new flexible retirement pension increased the probability of employment for those who 
turned 62 in 2011. This means that the first age cohort to be affected by the reform show 
promising results. Total time as an elderly pensioner has gone up from 17,6 years in 2001 to 
20,2 years in 2013 as a result of decline in retirement age as well as an increase in life 
expectancy. Both this paper and others indicate that the pension reform already shows some 
of its desired effect, but only time will tell the full impact. Another example is a study on 
workforce participation before and after the reform by Nordby et al. (2013) . They found that 
an increase in work participation rate started before the reform, but that the change from 2011 
to 2012 had a stronger growth than previous years. It is too early to confirm the underlying 
cause of this growth, but I am sure we will see many studies on this topic in the near future.  
 
There is less literature concerning job-to-job mobility among senior workers in Norway. The 
first extensive work I have found on the topic is done by Johansen (2013) at Statistics Norway 
and the only earlier mentioning is a brief section in a report about “Seniors in the workforce” 
by Lohne and Næsheim (2006), also from Statistics Norway. After 2008 Statistics Norway 
has started collecting data on job change specifically, indicating that the topic is attributed 
increased importance in the future.  
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4.1. Work or pension? What influences the decision to continue working 
one more year (Bråthen and Bakken, 2012) 
In this paper Bråthen and Bakken (2012) identify the factors with the greatest impact on a 
senior individual’s decision to work another year. The paper follows individuals at the age 61-
69 years over a ten year period from 2001 to 2010. Both genders are included in the study and 
work in both private and public sector. They use register data from this 10-year period on 
employment, income, demographic characteristics, education and health (measured as sick 
leave over the last 5 years). They use a business survey to control for economic fluctuations 
and shifting demand of workers. To test the probability of a worker staying on one more year 
they use a logistic regression, and sort the results by the “push, pull and jump” effect. 
4.1.1. The decision of retiring 
 
Bråthen and Bakken (2012) categorize the factors influencing the decision of retirement into 
three groups; “pull”, “push” and “jump”. The first category “pull” incorporates the decision 
maker’s job satisfaction; with the work environment, the significance wellbeing between 
colleges, wages and tasks. The category can be compared with valuation of the balance 
between work and leisure. “Push” are the factors pushing seniors out of the workforce; for 
example health or structural changes in the labour market, both making the older fraction of 
the workforce less qualified and productive than the younger employees. Both “pull” and 
“push” contains the decision maker’s own actions, while the last category “jump” includes 
third party decisions, mainly family considerations such as custody of a child and spouse 
retirement decisions. For the population as a whole there were three main factors contributing 
to the retirement decision; health, spouse’s decision and the possibility of AFP (early 
retirement).  
4.1.2. Results 
Of the factors considered, Bråthen and Bakken (2012) found three variables with larger 
impact on the decision of retirement. Topmost of these, and much supported by common 
sense, is health. Bråthen and Bakken (2012) use the amount of sick leave the last 5 years as a 
measure for an individual’s health condition. They find that a higher amount of sick leave 
increase the probability of leaving the workforce early. They also found that the health 
variable is sensitive to economic fluctuations and has a greater effect in economic downturns. 
Spouses’ decision on whether to continue working has the second largest effects on the 
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decision of retirement. The spouses’ effect is increasing with age and largest for the most 
senior workers. The third largest effect is whether the individual is employed in an AFP-firm 
in the private sector; this will increase the likelihood of early pension. The effect was much 
smaller for those employed in the public sector. The three variables with largest effect reduce 
the likelihood of working next year with 11, 10, and 9 percentage points respectively.  
 
Certain factors influence the decision to a lesser degree and increase the likelihood of working 
another year, such as geographic centrality (+1 p.p.), having higher education and income (+5 
p.p.) and being an immigrant (+1 p.p.). Other lesser factors influence in the opposite direction 
like working in a company with more than 30 employees (-4 p.p.) or working in the public 
sector (-3 p.p.).  
 
Bråthen and Bakken (2012) also test for any impact by the new pension reform. They specify 
that it is still too early to give any definite results and the numbers they present is only an 
indication. The pension reform indicates a small increase in the probability of working one 
more year (+1p.p.) 
 
4.2. Literature on job change; descriptive statistics by Johansen (2013)  
Johansen (2013) at Statistics Norway have produced a report with descriptive statistics on job 
change among senior workers from 2008-2013. Johansen (2013) uses much of the same 
registered data as I do, but the construction of the data and the time period differ. This report 
is the first extensive work on job change done by Statistics Norway and I will use the results 
to compare with my own findings. In this report Johansen (2013) divides the sample 
population into age groups. She compares different classifications of senior workers and has a 
younger group as reference. The overall results of the statistics show a decline in job changes 
with the increase of age. 
4.2.1. Constructing the variable on job change 
Johansen (2013) defines job change two ways; either change of establishment or change of 
establishment across enterprises
3
. By the first definition a job change has occurred if a 
working individual has a change in the identification number of the employing establishment 
from one year to another. The second definition must have a change in both establishment- 
                                                 
3
 An illustration on the difference between establishment and enterprise can be found on page 35 (Figure 8). 
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and enterprise number to be registered as a job change. The other way around, with changes 
in enterprise but not establishment, is not registered as a job change because it usually only 
signifies change in company ownership (for example from personally owned to a limited 
company). All changes in establishment are registered as job change by the first definition, a 
change of establishment within an enterprise could for example be a teacher changing schools 
within a municipality or county. A change of position within an establishment, like for 
example a promotion, is not qualified as job change here. Naturally job change between all 
establishments is expected to be higher than those between enterprises, since all job changes 
in the second are incorporated in the first. 
4.2.2. Results 
The report by Johansen (2013) focus on senior workers and use results from other age groups 
to compare. She divides the population into the age groups <35 years, 35-49 years, 50-54 
year, 55-61 years and 62-66 years. She uses the second group as a benchmark throughout the 
report while the youngest is mainly excluded. Workers older than 66 years are excluded 
because of low numbers.  
 
The overall level of job change between establishments is about 15 per cent, though this is 
much pulled by the youngest category where approximately 1 in 4 change job in any year. 
The report found a decline in job change over age, respectively 13,3 per cent, 9,5 per cent, 7,4 
per cent and 5,6 per cent for the remaining age groups (in year 2008-2009). The high number 
for the youngest group is probably connected with education. 
 
The figure below show the level of job change between enterprises found by Johansen (2013).  
Approximately 10-11 per cent of working individuals conducts a job change between 
enterprises each year and the level decrease with age. It is the mobility between enterprises I 
will analyse in this thesis, and to more easily compare results I have created a bar chart using 
the same age groups as Figure 4, it can be found on page 37 (Figure 9).  
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Figure 4: Job change between enterprises, by age. 2008-20012. Per cent
4
 
 
 
 
In addition to look at mobility across age groups the report looks at the level of job change by 
variables such as education level, gender, establishments and enterprises, sectors, industries 
and the centrality of the residence municipality. The results show that the level of job change 
is evenly spread across gender, education level and centrality of residence municipality. 
While the other categories show more differences. The level of job changes between 
industries is the most diverse. Frequency is rather low in manufacturing, retail and teaching 
with an average between 3 to 5 per cent for the senior employees, while business service has 
twice as many job changes, closely followed by transport and health.  
 
When looking at job change in establishments versus enterprises Johansen (2013) finds a 
lower rate in the latter. This is because changes in establishments also incorporate most 
changes in enterprises. This is also the only variable with a distinctive gender difference, 
showing a higher proportion of men than women shifting between enterprises. This can be 
explained by the high frequency of women working in the public sector, employed for 
instance by municipalities or county-municipalities. Both are large enterprises and job 
changes undertaken by these employees will only be registered as a change between 
establishments and not between enterprises. The same reasoning can be used when looking at 
the differences between establishments and enterprises in public and private sector in general.  
 
                                                 
4
 Source: JOHANSEN, I. 2013. Jobbsikfter blant eldre arbeidstakere. Reports. Statistics Norway. Page 11 
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5. The dataset and descriptive statistics 
This chapter contain an overview of the dataset I use in the empirical analysis. I will start by 
giving a brief note on the origin of the data. After that follows a more detailed listing of the 
sample individuals background characteristics and information on the explanatory variables. 
Than follow two subsections with information on the two independent variables  
 
In the analysis I will use data from the database FD-Trygd. The dataset is composed for 
welfare studies and is collected and managed by Statistics Norway. FD-Trygd contains 
information on the entire Norwegian population on topics like demographic data, information 
on income, benefit schemes, employment information and education. All is gathered through 
different registers: Income variables through Certificate of Pay and Tax Deductions (LTO) 
and Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration (NAV), work details by the 
employer/employee register (Aa) and education details through Norwegian National 
Education Database (NUDB)). All data are made anonymous through a common “key” 
connecting the individual’s social security number so we can follow each individual over 
time. Additionally I have used information from Norwegian Social Sciences Data Service 
(NSD) to identify and sort municipality numbers into counties
5
.  
 
The panel sample used in this analysis is collected yearly from 2003-2008 and contains every 
individual between the age 50 to 68 years during these six years. There are a total of 
1,183,520 unique individuals meeting these credentials, which gives a total of 5,668,798 
observations. This is an unbalanced panel since I do not have observations for every person 
each year; 703,871 of the individuals are observed every year, the remaining 479,649 is 
observed less than six years and of those 94,406 individuals is only observed one year. This is 
not an issue since the missing variables are random and not systematically distributed. This 
panel is also classified as a short panel since we have observations of a large number of 
individuals over a few time periods. First generation immigrants were removed from the 
dataset so only individuals with Norway as birth country remain in the sample. All individuals 
who die during the observation period are also removed from the sample.  
 
The income data available is gathered through the Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Administration (NAV) and only contains the sum of pensionable income rounded to the 
                                                 
5
 NSD are not responsible for the interpretations done in this thesis.  
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nearest 100. Since only pensionable income is registered, all values are positive or 0 and no 
negative income displayed. For my sample this data is only available up to and including year 
2006, which means that we are missing income data from 2007 and 2008. But I have data 
from before 2003, and to avoid reducing the number of years represented in the rest of the 
dataset all the NAV data is presented with a two year lag. Through the NAV register I also get 
the total number of years an individual has pensionable income higher than 1 B.a., which is a 
good measure on experience in the workforce. All income variables in this paper are 
represented in 2008 monetary value. The values were converted using Statistic Norway’s 
consumer price index, which was deemed accurate enough for the purposes of this paper. 
  
The employer/employee register (Aa) follow the International Labour Organization (ILO) in 
defining an employee as one who has worked at least 4 hours and is expected to work 
minimum 7 days. This will also include people with temporary leave because of sickness, 
vacation, military service or other paid leaves. Delays in registration by the companies could 
be a source of error in the data, but such an error should be evenly distributed over time. The 
register got new administration routines in 2005, which could potentially create another 
source of errors. The information on employment is divided into several different structures, 
and the sample used in this analysis makes use of two of these structures. A more detailed 
explanation of the sample construction will follow later in this chapter and in Appendix A. 
 
In this chapter I will start by presenting some background characteristics for the individuals in 
the dataset. The focus of this analysis is mobility among senior workers and the variables 
included in the next section have been chosen from what best can identify their characteristics 
for our purposes. More specifically I will look at gender, education, occupational status, 
sector of work, marital status and eventual children. The next section will include 
explanations and descriptive statistics on the two dependent variables in this analysis. 
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5.1. Background characteristics 
In the following tables the characteristics are displayed as a cross section of the panel, 
displaying only the year 2005. The year was picked randomly. The table show the distribution 
of the sample population by different variables. All values are presented as a percentage of the 
total population. Throughout the paper I will do separate regressions and analysis for men and 
women, and have therefore chosen to display all the descriptive statistics separately as well. 
The panel have an even number of men and women.  
5.1.1. Age, education and family life 
Table 2: Background characteristics (year 2005), per cent 
  Women Men 
Gender 49,56 50,44 
Age     
50-55 years 35,91 36,68 
56-61 years 35,57 36,02 
62-66 years 21,17 20,53 
67-68 years 7,36 6,76 
Education     
No education 0,30 0,35 
Mandatory primary education 26,75 21,98 
Upper secondary school 50,06 50,83 
Bachelor 18,92 16,48 
Master/PHD 2,66 8,86 
No information on education 1,32 1,50 
Marital status     
Not married 33,87 31,54 
Married 66,13 68,46 
Spouse status (if married)     
Working 52,80 59,39 
Social insurance/pension 7,47 5,34 
Occupational pension 8,37 4,80 
Disability benefit 16,08 20,44 
Other 15,28 10,03 
Children     
No child under 18 91,90 85,00 
One or more children 8,10 14,90 
Note: Each cell sums up to 100 percent 
 
The second variable listed is Age, which is one of the most important explanatory variables in 
the analysis. By the mean age of the population, we can see that women are slightly older than 
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men, which is to be expected because of the difference in life expectancy. In the table I have 
divided age into four groups to give an indication of the age distribution in the sample.  
 
The next section concerns the individuals’ highest achieved education level. The largest share 
of individuals (50 per cent) has upper secondary as highest achieved education level and is 
almost equally distributed among men and women. Upper secondary school also includes 
Craft certificates and apprenticeships. It is a bit more likely for women than men to have 
mandatory primary school as highest education level (26,77 per cent for women and 21,98 
per cent for men). There are two categories of higher education and I have named them 
Bachelor and Master/PHD for simplicity (though the titles were not used in Norway until 
later). Bachelor represents 3 years of higher education, while Master/PHD represent 3+ years. 
The Bachelor category will typically include teachers, nurses and engineers, and this category 
hold a slightly higher percentage of women (18,92 per cent) than men (16,48 per cent). The 
Master/PHD category is the academics, doctors and civil engineers with 2,66 percent women 
and 8,86 per cent of the men. A small fraction of the data is categorized under No information 
on education, this might be individuals who have received part or all of their education 
abroad. And the last 0,32 per cent of the individuals in the dataset is registered under No 
education, and include those who have not completed mandatory primary school. 
 
Totally 67,30 per cent of the individuals in the sample are married, while the remaining 
individuals are characterized as “not married”, though there is no distinction between those 
who are single, partners, widowed, engaged etc.  
 
According to Bråthen and Bakken (2012) the spouses decision on whether to stay or leave the 
workforce, is one of the three variables with greatest impact on an individual’s decision to 
early retirement. The sample allows me to distinguish between who is married to whom, and I 
also have information on spouse’s income and whether it is from working, social insurance or 
disability benefit.  
 
The spouses’ status shows the occupation the individuals’ spouse is situated in (only those 
who are married are included). These categories differ a bit from the status categories for the 
individuals in the sample, because of the information we have available. The spouses’ activity 
status is generated similarly to the main sample individuals’ activity status, and is also 
presented as a categorical variable made up from several binary variables. The different 
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categories are based on income, social insurance/pension and year of disability benefit. The 
excess is sorted into a residual category named “other”. The working category of men’s 
spouses (usually women) are larger than that of women’s spouses, the reason for this is 
probably a combination of women’s longer life expectancy and men often marry women a 
few years younger. Many of the women’s spouses are already retired, which also explain the 
higher percentage receiving social insurance/pension.  
Less than 12 per cent of the individuals have children younger than 18 years old. This is not 
very surprising considering the age distribution in the sample. Children older than 18 years 
and eventual grandchildren are not registered here. This is probably not an issue since Bråthen 
and Bakken (2012) found no correlation between having children or grandchildren and the 
diction to stay in the workforce longer. My sample does not have data on children in the years 
2007-2008.   
5.1.2. Working life 
Throughout the thesis I will operate with two different definitions of the individuals working. 
One definition will be used when studying those who leave the workforce and the other will 
be used when studying job changes. The reason for this distinction is that not all who work 
are represented in the Aa-register, and many are sifted away when customising the job-change 
dataset. The largest group not present in the Aa-register is the self-employed, but I still want 
to keep them when studying those who exit. The other reason for different definitions is that 
exiting the workforce is sorted on individuals whole job change is sorted on job spell (since I 
wish to capture individuals with more than one job change. To better distinguish between the 
two definitions I have named the first definition “working” and the second “employed”.  
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Table 3: Descriptive, working and employed (2005), per cent
6
 
  Women Men 
Status     
Working 56,97 68,29 
Retirement benefit 7,02 6,30 
AFP (early retirement) 2,62 3,00 
Disability benefit 26,26 18,10 
Other 7,13 4,18 
Employed     
Registered employed 49,55 56,85 
Not registered employed 50,45 43,15 
Industry     
Private businesses 36,43 62,21 
Governmental enterprise
7
 2,88 6,41 
Municipality 35,66 14,16 
County 3,80 3,49 
Private financial institution 2,93 2,59 
Government 18,30 11,14 
Private/Public sector     
Private 39,46 64,81 
Public 60,54 35,19 
Work experience     
Years of income > 1 B.a. 
(mean) 23,85 years 32,1 years 
Note: Each cell sums up to 100 percent, with the exception of experience. 
 
The first definition of “working” is drawn out of the categorical variable Status, which shows 
the activity the individual is situated in, among which is the option working. The category 
Status is made up by binary variables created from income and social security variables. To 
be defined as a working in the sample the individual must have a yearly income larger than 1 
B.a.
8
. Both the early retirement- and the retirement variable are created from a variable 
representing the year an individual start with early retirement or retirement respectively. The 
disability benefit variable is created from the starting year of disability payment and the level 
of disability benefit. Since individuals in reality can hold more than one status simultaneously, 
the state with a higher percentage share will dominate. In the case of 50/50 work and 
disability benefit, the latter will take precedent. There are about 500 000 such observations, 
                                                 
6
 For my purposes only a few generalized sectors was required and I have created these six sectors from several 
more in the dataset. An overview of the grouping can be found in Appendix C. 
7
 An example of governmental enterprise is Statoil.  
8
 The annual amount is changed each year, and the size of the annual amount (B.a.) was obtained from NAV 
(2014) 
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approximately 40 000 per year. By this definition 68,29 per cent of men and 56,97 per cent of 
the women are working. Furthermore 7,02 per cent of the women and 6,30 per cent of the men 
in the sample receive retirement pension. The higher number for women can be explained by 
longer life expectancy combined with earlier retirement. The number of people in early 
retirement is quite even between men and women, respectively 3,00- and 2,62 per cent. 
Women are much more likely than men to be on disability benefit, 1 of 4 women and almost 1 
of every 5 men is out of the workforce for this reason (26,26- and 18,10 per cent). The 
reminding 5,64 per cent of the sample does not qualify to any of the categories above, and has 
been defined as “other”. This might be individuals that are voluntarily or involuntarily 
unemployed, or people earning less than 1 B.a. per year.  
 
The second definition “employed” is based in the Aa-register and contains all individuals in 
our sample with a registered employer, though this excludes every working individual that is 
self-employed. While creating the sample I also sifted out all individuals that work less than 
16 hours (2 days) per week. So to be categorised as employed the individual must have a 
registered employer and work more than 16 hours per week. The sifting by work hours 
removed about 10 per cent of the job changes from the sample. In total, 49,55 per cent of all 
women and 56,85 of the men are registered as employed. The lower number for this definition 
can be explained partly by those who are self-employed. There are approximately 150 000 
individuals with entrepreneurial income that are not registered as employees and 116 000 of 
those have entrepreneurial income above NOK 200 000. A more thorough explanation with 
graphic illustration on the structuring of the employee data can be found in Appendix A.  
 
Next to follow is the sector and industry the individuals are employed in (if employed and 
registered in the Aa register). This table display some gender differences, with a much larger 
portion of women in the public sector than men. This is especially evident for jobs in 
municipalities where women hold the largest share by far, and in private businesses which are 
dominated by men. 
 
The last variable is measuring the total number of years an individual has an income larger 
than 1 B.a. As expected this number is much lower for women than men. This variable can be 
used as a measure on experience in the workforce.  
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5.1.3. Income 
Income is another aspect of working life. The following table show the mean and standard 
division of income for the individuals and the spouses in this sample. 
 
Table 4: Income details 
VARIABLES N mean sd min max 
            
Pensionable income: Men 475,366 339,049 391,839 0 1.097e+08 
Pensionable income: Women 467,449 194,308 167,136 0 9.669e+06 
      Pensionable income: Men’s spouses 325,877 213,468 161,500 0 6.635e+06 
Pensionable income: Women's spouses 292,420 335,845 435,407 0 1.101e+08 
 
Figure 5 display sum of pensionable income over age by education and gender, but only for 
those still active in the workforce. The figure only includes ages 50-62 to get a general view 
of income for the different groups. As discussed in chapter 3.3, it is evident that by this time 
of the career the wage profiles have flattened. 
 
Figure 5: Median total pensionable income with age (50-62), by education level and 
gender 
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5.2. The dependent variable: Nonemployment 
The first dependent variable is nonemployment. I will start this section with explaining the 
term “nonemployment, then continuing with the how the variable is constructed. After that I 
will describe some of the results I expect when analysing the variable and finally conclude the 
section with some descriptive statistics about nonemployment.  
 
The term nonemployment means not working, and must not be confused with unemployment. 
When studying the dependent variable nonemployment I will not distinguish between the 
reasons of why the individual is leaving, whether it is to retirement, disability pension or just 
not wanting to work, I will only focus on whether the individual is working or not. The term 
“nonemployment’ is borrowed from Anne Beeson (1998) “Job‐to‐Job and Job‐to‐
Nonemployment Turnover by Gender and Education Level”. 
 
When analysing nonemployment I will use the first definition, “working”, for individuals 
active in the workforce. This dependent variable will be used to estimate the likelihood of an 
individual leaving the workforce. All the individuals are sorted into two categories; working 
or not working. The working category contains those who fulfil the ILO definition, where an 
employee is described as one who have worked at least 4 hours and is expected to work 
minimum 7 days (including people with temporary abstinence because of sickness, vacation, 
military service or other paid leaves), as well as the additional restriction I included keeping 
only those earning more than one B.a. yearly. Consequently nonemployment contains all the 
reminder individuals in the sample, who are divided into the remaining four status categories: 
Retirement, early retirement (AFP), disability pension and other. 
 
(Obviously) I expect the probability of leaving the workforce to increase with age since 
everyone will leave the workforce at some point. It is expected that individuals with heavy 
physical jobs leave earlier than those with less physical work as discussed in chapter 3.3. We 
can investigate this statement by looking at the effect of education and wage, since heavy 
physical work usually require less education and have lower wage than many sedentary jobs 
(Groot and Verberne, 1997). I also expect the individuals health condition to strongly 
influence the decision of leaving (Bråthen and Bakken, 2012). A heavy physical job might be 
taxing for the health with old age, but there are a number of other factors that influence health 
that I cannot control for using this dataset. From the results in Bråthen and Bakken (2012) I 
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also expect the spouses decision on leaving the workforce to have an impact on the 
probability. Whether the individual has an opportunity of early retirement is a second effect 
that probably has a large impact, though I only have observations on those who have utilized 
that opportunity, making it difficult to test.  
 
Figure 6 show the percentage of nonemployment on age by education and gender. It is based 
on the individual remaining in the workforce at any time, and show the percentage that leave 
at each age. The shape is quite similar in both figures, with one peak each for both the start of 
early retirement and the official retirement age. Women are more likely to leave the 
workforce than men at all ages, but the biggest difference is for those who have mandatory 
primary school as highest education. Figures on type of mobility by education can be found in 
Appendix B. 
 
Figure 6: Percentage of nonemployment by age, by education and gender. Per cent 
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Figure 7 show the percentage of nonemployment on age by sector and gender. Here the graph 
has three peaks for the public sector, the additional peak occur at age 65. This is because of 
the nature of the early retirement agreement for those who work in public sector. If an 
individual wait until 65 to take out early retirement he will receive full pension instead of the 
reduced amount at 62.  
 
Figure 7: Percentage of nonemployment on age, by sector and gender. Per cent 
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5.3. The dependent variable: Job change 
The main analysis in this thesis is job change (or job-to-job mobility). I will start this section 
by discussing what qualifies as a job change and some possible causes for conducting such a 
transit. I will follow with a brief introduction on how the job change variable is constructed in 
the data, and then give some of the result I expect from the analysis together with some 
descriptive statistics about job change. 
 
A job change can be explained in several different ways and can have a number of different 
underlying causes.  What qualifies as a new job depends on who you ask. Is it a job change 
with new colleagues and work environment? Or is a new organisation number on the pay 
check needed or must is also be a shift to a new enterprise not only establishment? The 
reasons people change jobs could be due to higher wage, more responsibility, new tasks, 
career progression, moving to a new place, or maybe because the spouse has a new job that 
require relocating. The reasons can also be of a less voluntary sort; like downsizing in the 
company or bankruptcy.  
 
When conducting both the analysis and descriptive statistics on job change I use the definition 
“Employed” of those in the workforce. Johansen (2013) defined job change two different 
ways; as a yearly change of establishment both within and across enterprises. In this analysis I 
will only look at job change across enterprise and not distinguish between every 
establishment. To explain further we can review the distinction between establishment and 
enterprise: All establishments are subject to an enterprise, but one enterprise can have more 
than one subordinate establishment. The figure below shows some examples.  
 
Figure 8: Graphic illustration on difference between establishment and enterprise 
 
 
It is only job change between enterprises that are interesting for this thesis. The reasoning is 
that an individual usually retain pension privileges when shifting within an enterprise.  
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All job spells are identified by a number accompanied with a number representing 
establishment and one representing enterprise. The job change variable is binary and created 
the same year as the change in enterprise number occurs.  Some additional restrictions have 
been implemented to clean the variable of the changes we are not interested in studying. Only 
one job change per individual per year is kept, and if an individual change enterprise only for 
a period of less than 60 days before returning, the two job spells are melted together. These 
job changes are excluded to remove for example seasonal work and other short employments. 
Also a change in enterprise number must be accompanied with a change in establishment 
number. This is done to avoid registering firms that are only changing type of ownership. 
 
I expect the frequency of job change to decline with age, career progression slows and for 
many there is the option of retiring instead of finding a new job. The reason for expected 
decline is a combination of demand and supply of senior workers. The demand of senior 
workers is low, so many senior workers often have difficulties finding new jobs. Companies 
are aware that productivity decline with age, and are thus often reluctant to hire (and even 
sometimes keep) senior workers (Daniel and Heywood, 2007, Hutchens, 1986). Groot (1997) 
found that the mobility cost usually is higher than the eventual wage increase a job change 
causes. They also found that tenure within a firm has a larger impact on mobility than age. 
This can be viewed by the theory on firm specific capital (Becker, 2009) discussed in chapter 
3.3. 
 
The low frequency of job change by senior workers can also be explained from the supply 
side: Most workers do not wish to change job. The high wages received as a result of the 
implicit contract cannot always be transferred to new firms, because of the productivity/wage 
gap and firm specific capital. So to reap the benefit of the contract, the workers wish to stay 
until mandatory retirement requires them to depart. And as described in the previous chapter 
many choose early retirement. To be able to utilize this option the individual needs to stay in a 
job that provides the arrangement, at least until the age 62. In cases of downsizing, senior 
workers are often protected by seniority or tenure, it is therefore risky to change jobs and lose 
this privilege 
 
The statistics reported in Johansen (2013) is a good source of  supporting results, and for 
better comparison I have divided this sample into the same age groups as presented there and 
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created a similar figure as Figure 4 one on page 23. The last group of columns representing 
age group 67-68 have to small sample size to give any definite results but is included to give 
an indication of the direction. Regarding the remaining age groups the percentage of job 
change is quite similar, though my results are slightly higher.  
 
Figure 9: Reproduction of graph by Johanson (page 19). Job change by year over age 
groups (Obs! Different scales in the original). 
 
 
Figure 10 show the percentage development in job change by age and the number of job 
changes respectively. As expected there is a steep decline in level of job change with age.  It 
is important to keep in mind that percentage is taken out of the total of people employed, not 
the whole population.  This means that the percentage are calculated based on a very different 
numbers per age, the number of individuals still working is reduced by 30 per cent by age 62 
and only 6 per cent are remaining at age 68. At age 50, 8118 men and 5313 women conducted 
a shift, while at 68 the number was 231 and 125 respectively. Both figures show a clear 
difference in level of job change by gender, with women having almost 2 per cent fewer job 
changes at every age.  
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Figure 10: Percentage and number of working population with job change, over age 
 
Figure 11 show a more surprising result. There is no appreciable difference in level of job 
change with level of education, while the difference between public and private sector is 
patent. One explanation could be that it is commonly known that governmental jobs have 
good pension programs, and for senior individuals approaching retirement there is much to 
gain by staying in a governmental position.   
 
 
Figure 11: Percentage of working population with job change over age, by education 
and sector 
 
The next figure will show that some of the gap between sectors can be partly explained by the 
same gap for gender. From the descriptive statistic on working sector (and elsewhere), we 
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know that there is a higher average of women in public sector than men, and further 
investigation reveals that much of the difference in gender is driven by the uneven 
deployment between sectors.  
 
Figure 12: Percentage of working population with job change over age, by sector and 
gender 
 
 
It is also interesting to observe where people change job to and whether they change working 
sector in the process. Table 5 show that most change within the same sector. This might be to 
keep an eventual pension agreement or because of a specific working skill that best applies to 
a specific sector. 
 
Table 5: Number of job changes between and within sector 
    Number of job changes Total 
Men 
Private to Public 5922 
65821 
Public to Private 5241 
Public to Public 12038 
Private to Private 42620 
Women 
Private to Public 4358 
36604 
Public to Private 3338 
Public to Public 12187 
Private to Private 16721 
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6. Econometric method 
In this chapter I will describe the econometric method used in the analysis. This paper focuses 
on labour mobility among senior workers in the Norwegian workforce in 2003-2008. I will 
analyse mobility from two different angles; the probability of exit from work and the 
probability of having a job change conditional on remaining in the workforce. I will look at 
how both probabilities develop over age.  
 
The different dependent variables share one characteristic; they are binary. I will start this 
chapter describing models used when we have discrete choices.  The dataset I have available 
is a panel, but for the regressions I will only use a cross section of the sample.  
 
My presentation of the econometric framework is based on Verbeek (2008) and Wooldridge 
(2012). 
6.1. Discrete choice model  
The aim of the regression analysis is to learn how explanatory variables affect the outcome y. 
When the dependent variable only takes two mutually exclusive values, a binary (or discrete) 
choice model is needed.  In a discrete choice model the dependent variable is usually defined 
as a dummy variable with the value 1 when the measured outcome occurs, and 0 otherwise. 
As is the case in this thesis: 
𝑦𝑖 =  {
1      𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑎 𝑗𝑜𝑏 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒/𝑖𝑠 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
  0    𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑛𝑜 𝑗𝑜𝑏 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒/𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘𝑖𝑛𝑔
 
Where 𝑖 represent the individual. 
 
I want to find the probability of the occurrence 𝑦𝑖 based on a variety of explanatory variables 
(𝑥𝑖) and a coefficient 𝛽, 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) =  𝐹(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) 
where F is a probability function. It then follows that: 
 Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝑥𝑖) =  1 − 𝐹(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽) 
 
(I) 
The estimate is considered valid and unbiased if the assumptions about the error term hold. 
The 𝑥𝑖 variables should be exogenous (II), the error term (𝜀𝑖) should be independent of 𝑥𝑖  
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(III) and the expected value of the error term should be 0, which means the regression line 
should be correct (on average)(IV). 
 𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖𝛽 (II) 
 𝐸(𝜀𝑖|𝑥𝑖) = 0 (III) 
 𝐸(𝜀𝑖) = 0 (IV) 
I have chosen to use logit in this analysis. The standard logistic distribution function as F in 
the probability model is given by: 
 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1) =  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝛽)
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝛽)
 
(V) 
 
As can be seen by the expression above, one of the advantages with the logit model is that the 
estimated probability always is limited between 0 and 1 when lim 𝑥𝑖 →  ± ∞.  
 
Discrete choice models are designed to determine the probability of one of the two outcomes 
directly. The probit and logit model are most common in applied work, and both have 
symmetric density functions that produce an S-shaped cumulative distribution as shown by 
the wavy line in Figure 13. The probit model assumes a standard normal distribution function, 
while logit assumes a logistic function. The cumulative distribution (CDF) gives very similar 
results for the probit and logit model, with logit having a bit longer tails.  
 
Figure 13: Linear and non-linear probability function 
 
 
The logit model is estimated by using Maximum Likelihood. The interpretation of coefficients 
in the logit model is a bit different than from those estimated than in a standard linear 
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Ordinary Least Square model. The estimated coefficients are the slope of the fitted values, 
and in the linear model the estimated coefficient will show the magnitude of an 
increase/decrease in the dependent variable with a one unit increase in an independent 
variable. The coefficient for the non-linear models tells that an increase in x will 
increase/decrease the likelihood that y=1, so the result coefficients in the logit model tell if the 
outcome of 1 is more or less likely. The different non-linear models have different forms, 
which in turn give the coefficients different scales; this also signifies that the results from 
different non-linear models cannot be compared directly. Evidently, only the sign of 
coefficients and not the magnitude can be interpreted directly. This is why it is better to 
consider the marginal effects of the changes in the explanatory variables. 
6.2. Marginal effects 
Calculating marginal effects is a useful tool when interpreting the coefficients from the logit 
model. Marginal effects are the change in the probability of y=1 given a 1 unit change in one 
of the explanatory variables and is expressed as a per cent. In a linear model the marginal 
effects are just the derivative of the model, but since logit has a non-linear functional form the 
derivative will depend on x, and the issue of direct interpretation remain unresolved. To avoid 
this problem we have to calculate the marginal effects for the logit model with a specific 
value of x, usually the mean. An alternative is to calculate margins for every individual in the 
sample and take the average of the result. I will use the latter as recommended by Cameron 
and Trivedi (2009). The expression for calculating marginal effect is given by:   
 
𝜕𝑃
𝜕𝑥𝑖𝑘
=  
𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝛽)
1 + 𝑒𝑥𝑝(𝑥𝑖𝛽)
 𝛽𝑘 
where 𝑘 is the number of independent variables. 
 
When the independent variable is a dummy variable the marginal effect is interpreted in 
comparison to the base category (x=0). With a group of dummy variables, for instance 
covering different types of education, the variable desired as base category is omitted from the 
regression. When the variable is continuous, the marginal effect show the increase/decrease in 
the probability that y=1 after a 1 unit change of x. For this reason the linear income variable is 
expressed in ten thousand NOK in the regression result. A change of 1 NOK in yearly income 
would have little effect on anything, and the marginal effect would be tiny. 
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6.3. Goodness-of-fit; pseudo R2 
A goodness-of-fit measure indicates the accuracy with which the model approximates the 
observed data. In a regular OLS regression, the R
2
 represents the proportion of the total 
sample variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variables. When 
using limited dependent variable models the measure is a calculated a bit differently. There 
are several options on calculating pseudo R
2
. I will use McFadden R
2
, which is the default 
method used by Stata.  
𝑀𝑐𝐹𝑎𝑑𝑑𝑒𝑛 𝑅2 = 1 −
log 𝐿1
log 𝐿0
 
L1 is the log likelihood of the model of interest and L0 is the log likelihood value when all the 
parameter except the intercept are equal to zero. From the function above it is easy to see that 
the McFadden R
2
 creates a ratio in the interval [0,1] and that if all coefficients in L1=0 the 
R
2
=0 . 
6.4. Curvilinear effects 
When using a logistic model we have the assumption that the binary dependent variable 
produces a linear relationship between the explanatory variables and the logit of the 
dependent variable. The resulting coefficients do not have to be linear, and sometimes a 
curvilinear shape to the slope may occur. This is a common occurrence in social sciences, and  
Osborne (2014) discuss underlying reasons and the importance of identifying the source of the 
curvilinear shape. Such curvilinearity can be a result misspecification of the model (omitted 
variable), poor coding or poor data cleaning, but it is just as likely one of the many things that 
are curvilinear by nature (Osborne, 2014). Age is an example that often has curvilinear 
qualities. This statement can be supported by common sense; there is for example naturally a 
curvilinear relationship at what age a woman can get pregnant. In some cases an author will 
change continuous variables into categories or groups, and depending on the nature of these 
groups the effect of the curvilinearity might be diminished or increased. Therefore dividing 
categorical variables into groups is most often not recommended (Osborne, 2014).  
 
It is quite easy to confirm an eventual curvilinear variable using the simple algebra of adding 
the squared (𝑥2) and cubic (𝑥3) term of the variable. If the squared term is significant there is 
at least one bend in the slope, and two bends if the cubic term is significant. Testing the 
squared and cubic terms of Age using my data yields all significant values, though adding the 
cubic term does not change the value of log likelihood at all and can thusly be ignored.  
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7.  Results 
7.1. The model 
I will study two types of mobility in this thesis; the probability of leaving the workforce and 
the probability of conducting a job change, both with age as the principal explanatory 
variable. The model presented below is the simplest of the tested models where Y represents 
either of the dependent variables. All regressions are run with men and women separately.  
 
The simple model equation 
Pr(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) =  𝐹(𝑥𝑖, 𝛽),  where x is a vector that includes the basic demographic variables 
such as education, years of income > 1 B.a., income, marital 
status and age.  
 
Most of the variables used in this regression are categorical and transformed into groups of 
dummy variables. To prevent falling in the “dummy trap”, base categories are used. I have 19 
Age dummies, representing individuals from 50-68 year old. I have chosen to use 51 as the 
base age group. I avoid using age 50 as base since every job change that occurs 1
st
 January 
will not be registered (I have no employment information on individuals at age 49). For the 
education group Primary School is used as base category.  
 
I will use several extensions to this model including spouse activity, sector, county and 
different varieties of the income variable. When including spouse occupation Working spouse 
is the base category, for the industry dummies Private sector is the comparison and for county 
Oslo is the base. I will also use interactions between age and income.  
 
Only the marginal effects of the logit regression will be reported in this chapter and in the 
Appendix. Please note that not all coefficients in the figures are significant, despite small 
confidence intervals. Whether the estimate is significant on the 1, 5 or 10 per cent level can be 
viewed in the tables accompanying the figures.
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7.2. Probability of nonemployment 
The first type of mobility I will study is “leaving the workforce”. I will use a cross section of 
the panel for the regression. The individuals are conditional on all being a part of the 
workforce when fist observed, thus all who are already out of employment (for any reason) 
are dropped. The cross section is made up by the last observation for each individual, which is 
either when exiting the workforce or the last observed year. The cross section have 804 301 
observations. With only a few exceptions, estimated coefficients of the regression model are 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Even though the variables are significant, variables such as 
income, experience in the workforce and marital status has only a small impact on the 
probability of leaving the workforce. The Pseudo R
2
 from the regressions on nonemployment 
is unusually high. A typical logit Pseudo R
2
 can often be between 3,5-6 per cent (Verbeek 
2008), but all reported in this section have a R
2
 value over 35 per cent.  
 
Because of the long list of explanatory variables I have divided the regression results into two 
figures. Figure 14 include coefficients from a collection of the control variables, while Figure 
15 shows coefficients from the main explanatory variable; Age. A more detailed table with 
results follows after the figures. 
Figure 14: Regression results (part I) of nonemployment with, by gender and education. 
Marginal effects with confidence intervals 
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In addition to dividing the results by gender, I have separated the regressions for those with 
low and high education. The low educated category includes individuals with mandatory 
primary and upper secondary school as highest education level. This category also includes 
the small groups with no education and no information on education. The highly educated 
group includes those with degrees from universities or university colleges. There are very 
clear differences in age coefficients for men in these two groups. This supports Lazear’s 
theory discussed in chapter 3, that those with high education are less likely to leave or shirk 
from work. There is not much difference between high and low educated women. This could 
be because fewer women with high education have sedentary positions, and more hold to 
heavier jobs as for example teachers and nurses.   
 
When including income in the regressions I tested different varieties of this variable: A 
logistic, a linear and an upper-quartile-dummy expression of the term.  All three expressions 
gave similar results, and the other coefficients did not change much with either. The logistic 
term was the first discarded, though the coefficients did not change much, many were less 
significant and additionally it is more difficult to interpret logistic terms directly. The upper-
quartile-dummy gave significant values, but such a distinction is not necessary here. So of the 
three forms I chose to use the linear term in this regression, I also added a squared term to 
control for eventual increase/decrease in the marginal effect of income. The squared term is 
significant but very close to zero which means the total effect of income is linear negative. To 
make the coefficients easier to read I change the income variable to show per 10 000 NOK. 
With a 10 000 NOK more in yearly income the probability of leaving the workforce decreases 
with 0,25 per cent for men and 0,4 per cent for women. 
 
When analysing exit from work I have chosen to include industry as an explanatory variable. 
The base category is the private sector (except financial institution). None have very strong 
impact, but it seems the individuals in other industries have a higher probability of leaving.  
 
Next I control for geographical effects by including the county where the individual work. 
Here Oslo is used as a base category., and it seems that people living in the south and west are 
less likely to leave the workforce, those in the north have a higher probability of leaving, 
while the east is mixed. The county coefficients are stronger for women than for men. The 
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estimated coefficients for county has been removed from Table 6, but can be found in 
Appendix E.I Table 12 
 
As mentioned in chapter 4.1.1 and 5.2 Bråthen and Bakken (2012) found that spouse activity 
should have a large impact on the individuals’ decision of leaving the workforce. When I 
include variables representing spouse activity in the regression, the estimated coefficients are 
significant but not large. The sign of the coefficients are similar to those in Bråthen and 
Bakken (2012), indicating that it is more likely for an individual with a spouse out of the 
workforce to leave as well.   
 
The next figure shows the Age coefficients, and the following table display the magnitude and 
significance level of most coefficients.  
 
Figure 15: Regression results (part II) of nonemployment with, by gender and 
education. Marginal effects with confidence intervals 
 
 
As expected the probability of leaving increase steadily with age until the lower early 
retirement age at 62, at that age the probability of leaving is almost doubled to 0,49 and 0,37 
for men and women respectively.. The margins decrease a bit, until the official retirement age 
at 67. For this regression the age 51 is used as base, and since one of the conditions of being 
included in the sample is that the individual is still working at age 50, the coefficient 
representing that age predicts no variation and is omitted.  There is also difference between 
men and women in the probability of leaving. Men have ha steeper increase and higher 
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probability of leaving with each year. Mind again that the base used in the regression is 51 so 
all probabilities are interpreted by that age. The higher marginal effects show that men are 
much more likely to leave at for example age 58 than age 51, not that they are more likely to 
leave the workforce earlier than women.  
 
Table 6: Estimated probability of nonemployment, by education. Marginal effects 
  Low education High education 
VARIABLES Men se Women se Men se Women se 
Nr.years income>B.a. -0.0211*** (0.0003) -0.0023*** (0.0002) -0.0072*** (0.0004) -0.0002 (0.0002) 
Income -0.0029*** (0.0001) -0.0042*** (0.0001) -0.0023*** (0.0001) -0.0041*** (0.0002) 
Income squared
9
 0.0000*** (0.0000) 0.0000*** (0.0000) 0.0000*** (0.0000) 0.0000*** (0.0000) 
Government -0.0031 (0.0031) 0.0271*** (0.0028) -0.0097*** (0.0029) 0.0032 (0.0042) 
Private finance 0.0310*** (0.0046) 0.0621*** (0.0049) 0.0436*** (0.0065) 0.0627*** (0.0126) 
County -0.0033 (0.0081) 0.0073 (0.0057) 0.0483*** (0.0033) 0.0520*** (0.0052) 
Municipality 0.0013 (0.0024) -0.0020 (0.0021) 0.0365*** (0.0027) 0.0349*** (0.0038) 
Governmental enterprises 0.0388*** (0.0032) 0.0623*** (0.0050) 0.0365*** (0.0049) 0.0723*** (0.0112) 
S
p
o
u
se
 
Social insurance -0.0037 (0.0036) 0.0196*** (0.0033) 0.0085* (0.0047) 0.0189*** (0.0040) 
Occupational 
pension 
0.0333*** (0.0030) 0.0376*** (0.0027) 0.0303*** (0.0030) 0.0321*** (0.0032) 
Disability pension 0.0325*** (0.0018) 0.0346*** (0.0025) 0.0311*** (0.0026) 0.0293*** (0.0037) 
Other 0.0258*** (0.0030) 0.0887*** (0.0032) 0.0324*** (0.0039) 0.0642*** (0.0040) 
52 0.0361*** (0.0108) 0.0239** (0.0098) 0.0181 (0.0165) 0.0181 (0.0132) 
53 0.0770*** (0.0103) 0.0394*** (0.0095) 0.0284* (0.0161) 0.0223* (0.0132) 
54 0.1160*** (0.0100) 0.0578*** (0.0092) 0.0265 (0.0164) 0.0315** (0.0129) 
55 0.1472*** (0.0098) 0.0728*** (0.0091) 0.0626*** (0.0152) 0.0611*** (0.0120) 
56 0.1842*** (0.0096) 0.0867*** (0.0089) 0.0881*** (0.0145) 0.0770*** (0.0118) 
57 0.2301*** (0.0094) 0.1165*** (0.0086) 0.1007*** (0.0144) 0.0845*** (0.0118) 
58 0.2825*** (0.0092) 0.1328*** (0.0084) 0.1115*** (0.0143) 0.1005*** (0.0115) 
59 0.3070*** (0.0092) 0.1462*** (0.0083) 0.1386*** (0.0140) 0.1119*** (0.0114) 
60 0.3326*** (0.0091) 0.1465*** (0.0083) 0.1686*** (0.0136) 0.1252*** (0.0113) 
61 0.3456*** (0.0091) 0.1556*** (0.0083) 0.1848*** (0.0136) 0.1355*** (0.0112) 
62 0.5621*** (0.0085) 0.3918*** (0.0076) 0.3924*** (0.0127) 0.3332*** (0.0102) 
63 0.5175*** (0.0087) 0.3347*** (0.0078) 0.3664*** (0.0129) 0.3094*** (0.0105) 
64 0.4844*** (0.0089) 0.2978*** (0.0082) 0.3360*** (0.0132) 0.2710*** (0.0109) 
65 0.4898*** (0.0090) 0.3152*** (0.0083) 0.3905*** (0.0131) 0.3085*** (0.0110) 
66 0.4758*** (0.0093) 0.2771*** (0.0089) 0.3568*** (0.0135) 0.2893*** (0.0117) 
67 0.8433*** (0.0108) 0.6738*** (0.0121) 0.6813*** (0.0143) 0.5636*** (0.0172) 
68 0.6084*** (0.0116) 0.4731*** (0.0160) 0.4591*** (0.0140) 0.3654*** (0.0170) 
R2 0,4321   0,36   0,4775   0,4324   
Observations 141,985   116,853   74,353   54,847   
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
      
                                                 
9
 The coefficient of income squared is not zero; only very close (e
-06
). 
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7.3. Probability of changing job 
In this section I will discuss the results from analysing the probability of conducting a job 
change. Again I will use a cross section of the panel available. In the previous analysis the 
individuals were included in this cross section conditional on being registered as working at 
the first observation, now I drop all observation from the year they leave the workforce.  The 
cross section only includes one observation per job spell, and for all who has conducted a job 
change during the observed time period, that observation will be used in the regression. For 
all others, the last year observed is included. Consequently an individual with multiple job 
changes during the observation period have more than one observation in the cross section.  
The cross section have 849 096 observations.  
 
I run separate regressions for gender, public and private sector, and for higher- and lower 
education. Pseudo R
2
 is much lower in the results on job change than nonemployment but still 
mostly sound. The first round of regression only have values from  1,72-2,10 per cent, but the 
results strengthen to 2,23-6,06 per cent after dividing the regression by education and adding 
geographic measures.  
 
As with the previous analysis I tested the different varieties of the income variable: A logistic, 
a linear and an upper-quartile-dummy expression of the term.  Again all three expressions 
gave the similar results, with small changes in the coefficients. I choose to continue with the 
dummy-variable because using a distinct group makes it easier to interpret the results. This 
variable is a dummy for the upper income quartile, and takes the value 1 for all who have 
more than 442 231 NOK pensionable income yearly. We can assume that the education 
variable for Master/PHD is correlated with the income
10
 since most with more than 3 years of 
higher education will belong to this income group. Because of this correlation, the dummy 
representing Master/PHD education is rendered insignificant since its explanation value is 
captured by the Upper income quartile dummy. This effect only occurs in the regressions for 
men and not women; this could be because very few women of that time and age belong to 
the upper income quartile (only 15 per cent of the quartile)
11
. I have also tested with the 
variables representing spouse activity in the model, but none proved significant and were 
therefore dropped from the final result.  
                                                 
10
 The correlation table in Appendix D confirms this statement 
11
 Men 75 per cent > Women 95 per cent (495 000 > 482 600) 
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7.3.1. The simple model with age-income interactions, by sector 
This first series of regressions are of the simple model written out in chapter 7.1. including 
age-income interaction terms. Figure 16 shows the probability of changing job by gender and 
sector, and only the age- and age*income coefficients are included in the figure. The details of 
the remaining coefficients can be found in Table 8.When discussing the probability of job 
change in chapter 5.3 I assumed that (like nonemployment), the probability of job change 
would decline with age. But the coefficients have a curvilinear shape, and the probability of 
job change will increase before the decline. This result diverge a bit form previous results on 
job mobility. Early work found a negative relationship between job mobility and experience 
(Mincer and Jovanovic, 1982, Parsons, 1975), and later Topel and Ward (1992) found the 
opposite result when also controlling for wage, though they studied much younger 
individuals.  
 
The marginal effects are all above zero until the age 58-59, so the probability of changing jobs 
is higher in the rest fifties than at the base at 51. The peak of the marginal effects is a bit 
different for each regression but lies between the ages 53-55.  
 
Figure 16: Regression results job change with age*income interaction terms, by gender 
and sector. Marginal effects with confidence intervals
12,13
 
 
                                                 
12
 Base is 51. Age 68 was excluded from the figure because of very a large confidence interval. 
13
 In the figure all other variables than Age and Age*Income interactions are removed for simplicity, but still a 
part of the underlying regression. 
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The age-income interaction terms draw out the part of the age coefficient that is explained by 
income for the individuals from the high income quartile. As a result the effects of the high 
income group and the low income group can be studied separately. The Age coefficients show 
the probability of job change for all who are not a part of the upper income quartile, while the 
sum of both the age- and interaction coefficients show the effect on those with the high 
income. For the coefficients for individuals not in the upper income quartile, the likelihood of 
changing jobs peaks at age 54 for both genders in private sector: Man are 3,74 per cent and 
women 2,54 per cent  more likely to change jobs at age 54 than the base at age 51. As can be 
seen from the lower part of Figure 16, the high income effect draws in the opposite direction 
than the age affect, and income have increased impact with age. For the interactions the 
marginal effects for Age is calculated by adding 
𝐴𝑔𝑒 + 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 + 𝐴𝑔𝑒 ∗ 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑒 
In the regressions on women almost none of the interaction coefficients are significant, so 
hence I will only focus on the results from the regressions on men in this section. The 
interaction coefficients are only significant for age 55-65.  
Table 7: Example of probability of job change for the different income groups 
Age Income group 
Calculating marginal 
effect 
Final marginal 
effect 
56 
Upper income quartile 0,0279+(-0,0260)+0,0134 0,0153 
Lower income 0,0279 0,0279 
64 
Upper income quartile (-0,1056)+(-0,0260)+0,0367 -0,0949 
Lower income -0,1056 -0,1056 
 
For the remaining explanatory variables the marginal effects are rather small. Most are 
significant, with the exception of Master/PHD for men, No education and a few more 
variables in the regression for men working in public sector. The first is not significant for the 
reasons mentioned earlier and the second probably because No education has a very small 
sample size. The regression for men in public sector have an additional curiosity, the 
coefficient for Bachelor is negative. If speculating, I would guess that this category include 
many teachers, which Johansen reported having a low percentage of job-to-job mobility. 
Otherwise it is clear that the higher educated, the more likely one are to change jobs as a 
senior worker, if only by a very small percentage. All are less likely to change jobs if married, 
though for men the effect is less than 1 per cent. Experience (or years of income > 1 B.a) have 
only a small negative effect for most groups, this is consistent with the findings done by 
Ghosh (2007) where the probability of job change is decrease with experience. 
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Table 8: Estimated prob. of job change with age/income interactions, marginal effects 
 
Men Women 
VARIABLES Private (se) Public (se) Private (se) Public (se) 
No education 0.0125 (0.0229) -0.0078 (0.0401) 0.0344 (0.0274) -0.0332 (0.0346) 
Upper secondary 0.0043** (0.0018) 0.0062** (0.0030) 0.0098*** (0.0024) 0.0104*** (0.0020) 
Bachelor 0.0098*** (0.0025) -0.0296*** (0.0034) 0.0263*** (0.0033) 0.0166*** (0.0021) 
Master/PHD -0.0014 (0.0035) -0.0072* (0.0038) 0.0301*** (0.0066) 0.0393*** (0.0029) 
No info on educ 0.0139 (0.0091) 0.0368*** (0.0137) 0.0321** (0.0142) 0.0504*** (0.0090) 
Married -0.0092*** (0.0015) -0.0022 (0.0019) -0.0367*** (0.0019) -0.0243*** (0.0012) 
Nr.years inc>B.a. -0.0044*** (0.0002) 0.0002 (0.0003) -0.0014*** (0.0002) -0.0003*** (0.0001) 
50 -0.0451*** (0.0035) -0.0295*** (0.0045) -0.0427*** (0.0040) -0.0155*** (0.0025) 
52 0.0208*** (0.0037) 0.0126*** (0.0047) 0.0166*** (0.0043) 0.0133*** (0.0026) 
53 0.0371*** (0.0038) 0.0226*** (0.0048) 0.0261*** (0.0044) 0.0193*** (0.0026) 
54 0.0374*** (0.0039) 0.0151*** (0.0049) 0.0229*** (0.0045) 0.0160*** (0.0027) 
55 0.0303*** (0.0041) 0.0147*** (0.0050) 0.0254*** (0.0046) 0.0143*** (0.0028) 
56 0.0279*** (0.0042) -0.0053 (0.0052) 0.0139*** (0.0047) 0.0056* (0.0029) 
57 0.0171*** (0.0042) 0.0106** (0.0051) 0.0001 (0.0048) 0.0022 (0.0030) 
58 0.0051 (0.0044) -0.0065 (0.0054) -0.0091* (0.0050) -0.0053* (0.0032) 
59 -0.0066 (0.0045) -0.0285*** (0.0057) -0.0220*** (0.0052) -0.0149*** (0.0033) 
60 -0.0240*** (0.0047) -0.0286*** (0.0057) -0.0493*** (0.0055) -0.0275*** (0.0036) 
61 -0.0810*** (0.0052) -0.0921*** (0.0066) -0.1006*** (0.0061) -0.0545*** (0.0040) 
62 -0.0621*** (0.0058) -0.0858*** (0.0075) -0.1003*** (0.0072) -0.0451*** (0.0045) 
63 -0.0855*** (0.0070) -0.0915*** (0.0091) -0.1046*** (0.0084) -0.0596*** (0.0058) 
64 -0.1056*** (0.0080) -0.1104*** (0.0106) -0.1337*** (0.0100) -0.0660*** (0.0065) 
65 -0.1151*** (0.0090) -0.0939*** (0.0109) -0.1437*** (0.0112) -0.0636*** (0.0073) 
66 -0.2075*** (0.0111) -0.1578*** (0.0139) -0.2210*** (0.0139) -0.1007*** (0.0095) 
67 -0.1436*** (0.0288) -0.1168*** (0.0332) -0.1759*** (0.0382) -0.0592** (0.0233) 
68 -0.2366** (0.1054) -1.7347 (91.0864) (Omitted)   -0.0823 (0.0542) 
High Income -0.0260*** (0.0043) -0.0024 (0.0058) -0.0241*** (0.0089) 0.0139** (0.0062) 
(50)*High Income -0.0121** (0.0059) -0.0045 (0.0080) 0.0002 (0.0120) -0.0126 (0.0085) 
(52)*High Income -0.0043 (0.0063) -0.0003 (0.0084) 0.0057 (0.0131) 0.0022 (0.0088) 
(53)*High Income -0.0049 (0.0064) 0.0063 (0.0084) 0.0041 (0.0138) -0.0090 (0.0092) 
(54)*High Income 0.0055 (0.0066) 0.0135 (0.0086) 0.0295** (0.0138) 0.0084 (0.0091) 
(55)*High Income 0.0111* (0.0067) 0.0198** (0.0086) 0.0231 (0.0142) -0.0102 (0.0097) 
(56)*High Income 0.0134* (0.0068) 0.0299*** (0.0088) 0.0129 (0.0154) 0.0067 (0.0101) 
(57)*High Income 0.0216*** (0.0070) 0.0104 (0.0087) 0.0222 (0.0160) 0.0005 (0.0105) 
(58)*High Income 0.0192*** (0.0072) 0.0326*** (0.0089) 0.0479*** (0.0158) -0.0004 (0.0111) 
(59)*High Income 0.0184** (0.0074) 0.0331*** (0.0094) 0.0200 (0.0177) 0.0133 (0.0114) 
(60)*High Income 0.0315*** (0.0077) 0.0277*** (0.0096) 0.0380** (0.0186) 0.0073 (0.0123) 
(61)*High Income 0.0402*** (0.0086) 0.0636*** (0.0105) 0.0300 (0.0226) 0.0287** (0.0129) 
(62)*High Income 0.0326*** (0.0095) 0.0700*** (0.0117) 0.0098 (0.0275) 0.0148 (0.0150) 
(63)*High Income 0.0364*** (0.0116) 0.0310** (0.0148) -0.0023 (0.0336) 0.0055 (0.0201) 
(64)*High Income 0.0367*** (0.0135) 0.0576*** (0.0162) 0.0850*** (0.0317) -0.0049 (0.0232) 
(65)*High Income 0.0324** (0.0156) 0.0459*** (0.0176) 0.0293 (0.0438) -0.0408 (0.0355) 
(66)*High Income 0.0328 (0.0202) 0.0759*** (0.0223) 0.0354 (0.0526) 0.0317 (0.0313) 
(67)*High Income 0.0781* (0.0422) 0.0340 (0.0472) 0.0639 (0.0920) 0.0507 (0.0521) 
(68)*High Income -0.1906 (0.1803) 1.6291 (91.0864) (Omitted)   (Omitted)   
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 R2 0,0176   0,0172   0,0210   0,0192 
 Observations 315,529   155,787   156,252   219,796   
Standard errors in parentheses 
      *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
             
7.3.2. Extended model: By education 
The extended regression is separated by high and low education level. Again the low educated category 
includes the individuals with mandatory primary and upper secondary school as highest education level, as 
well as the groups with no education and no information on education. The highly educated group include 
Bachelor or Master/PhD. In this model I have extended the control variables to include county of work and 
industry. The regression results are divided into two figures, the Figure 17displaying the age coefficients 
and  
Figure 18 display the remaining coefficients. The complete table of results can be found in 
Appendix E, section E.II Job change, Table 13.  
 
Figure 17: Regression results job change (part I), by gender and education. Marginal 
effects with confidence intervals 
 
Note: Base is 51, and age 68 was again excluded from the figure because of very a large confidence interval 
 
The most interesting feature of this second regression is the distinct difference in probability 
for men with high and low education, and simultaneously the lack of difference in the two 
categories of women. The regression results by sector form chapter 7.3.1 showed a higher 
probability of job change for individuals working in the private sector. The distinction is more 
prominent between education levels than between sector. We can assume that most jobs 
requiring lower education are in the private sector. This coincides with Lazear’s theory 
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presented in chapter 3. Asymmetric information about the highly educated workers’ 
productivity creates the demand for an implicit contract to keep up incentives. When the 
outcome is difficult to observe, the implicit contract must save the bulk of the payment until 
late in the career, which creates the gap between productivity and wage (Lazear, 1979). The 
individuals with less education can more easily change job without reduction in pay. Another 
reason for the higher probability of job change could be that this group is often more sensitive 
to economic fluctuations, and are therefore more often exposed to changes in labour demand. 
 
Figure 18: Regression results job change (part II), by gender and education. Marginal 
effects with confidence intervals 
 
Note: Base variable is Private sector (except private finance) and Oslo 
 
 
Geographical location have more effect on women’s’ probability job change, with most 
counties showing a lower probability for job change by women than the base county Oslo. 
Working in a municipality or municipality-county reduces the probability of job change 
much. This might be because many working there change position or establishment within the 
enterprise (municipality/county). 
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8. Concluding remarks 
In this chapter I will conclude the thesis by discussing the results from chapter 7 in light of 
theories, empirical papers and the new legislation proposal featured earlier. I will first look at 
results from the two dependent variables separately, and then I will discuss the robustness of 
the results and finally conclude with some suggestions to future research.  
 
Exit from the workforce 
Lazear’s theory predicts that individuals with high wages and high education are those who 
stay in the workforce longest. This is confirmed by the results from both the descriptive 
statistics and regression results from the analysis of exit from work. The difference is most 
palpable for men separated into groups of educational level, where the probability of leaving 
is much higher for those with low education than those with high education. The two 
education levels amongst women have almost the same probability of leaving the workforce. 
In the future it will be interesting to see if this probability changes when the generations with 
a larger portion of highly educated women come of age.  
 
There is an ongoing debate about extending the mandatory retirement age from 70 to 72, and 
the internal company age limit from 67 to 70 (the second age limit applies if agreed upon by 
employer and employee ex ante) (Prop. 48 L, 2014-2015). This is the age where a firm of 
legal grounds can terminate an employment contract based on age. It is only a very small 
fraction of the population that will be affected by this legislation since most leave the 
workforce before age 67, but those it does affect is usually very resourceful individuals and 
often costly to the employing firm. Figure 19 is a recurrence of the income figure from 
chapter 5.1.3, only expanded to incorporate the last years. The figure shows the median 
income of the individuals still active in the workforce. I use the first definition of “working”, 
to also include all who are self-employed. It is obvious that those who continue working after 
the standard retirement age at 67 are very resourceful individuals regardless of gender or 
education. The small sample is a selection, but it is interesting to note that 24 per cent are in 
governmental positions, 28 per cent in private businesses and 35 per cent are not registered in 
the Aa-register. Since the last category has no registered employer, they are presumed to be 
self-employed. The big dip in income observed in the years before the retirement age can be a 
result of a reduction in working hours, and thus a reduction in pensionable income. These 
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individuals might still have early retirement- or disability pensions to compensate the lack of 
working income.  
 
Figure 19: Median of total pensionable income with age (50-68) for individuals still 
working, by education level and gender 
 
When analysing the probability nonemployment I also controlled for spouses’ decision of 
leaving the workforce. Bråthen and Bakken (2012) found that the spouses decision had strong 
effect on the probability of working another year, they defined this as the “jump” effect. My 
results indicate the same, but not as strongly. Of the three effects “pull”, “push” and “jump” 
discussed in chapter 4.1.1 it is difficult to say which increase the probability of leaving more 
without variables measuring the individuals’ health and a variable on the workers satisfaction.  
 
If Prop. 48 L is approved, it is plausible that the legislation will have little effects on the ratio 
of senior workers. And as expressed in the official hearing, the Organization for Norwegian 
Empoyers (NHO) is not entusiasthic about the cost the legislation entails. It is also interesting 
to note that the government seems to propose excluding the public sector from the new 
regulations (the section describing this Prop. 48 L (2014-2015) is a bit ambiguous). 
 
The fact that the individuals’ who stay long in the workforce are more often highly educated 
does not necessarily imply a causal relationship between education and exiting the workforce.  
I do not have information on the individuals’ health status, and that might capture much of the 
effect.  
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Job change 
When analysing the probability of a job change I found that the coefficients have curvilinear 
shape, I expected a steady decline in job change with age, but the probability of changing will 
increase for an individual in early fifties, before declining. The income*age interaction 
strengthens the conformation of Lazear’s theory by refining the group with the expected 
higher productivity/wage-gap. If an individual belong to the upper income quartile, the 
probability of changing is smaller than for the group with lower income. When dividing the 
regressions into education the results are even more distinct, isolating the group with jobs 
where it is difficult to observe effort and outcome. These individuals do not wish to change 
jobs because firm specific capital and productivity gives higher wages at the current position 
than at any alternative firm, so they are comfortable staying in their current positions.  
 
I can only speculate on the reasons of why the probability of job change increase for 
individuals in their fifties. There are many effects that could influence the probability in either 
direction. If we look at the combination of both the dependent variables, it is plain that those 
with the highest probability to leave, also have a higher probability of job change. Is this 
because their jobs are more sensitive to economic fluctuations, or because it is hard to keep a 
heavy physical job late in the career? 
 
The decline in job change (in the sixties) is twofold. It can partly be explained by the 
diminishing demand for senior workers: Companies are well aware that the level of 
productivity decreases with age, and are not interested in hiring such costly workers (Hek and 
Vuuren, 2011, Hutchens, 1986, Daniel and Heywood, 2007). It is easier to hire younger 
workers and then invest in on-the-job training for this worker (Brooke, 2003, Prskawetz and 
der Wissenschaften, 2006).  Secondly; the workers do not wish to leave. The high wages 
received as a result of the implicit contract cannot always be transferred to new firms, because 
of the productivity/wage gap and firm specific capital. So to reap the benefit of the contract, 
the workers wish to stay until mandatory retirement requires them to depart.  
 
There is another ongoing debate regarding a new legislation in the Work Environment Act. 
The present government seek to ease the regulations on permanent employment, making it 
easier to employ workers on more short term contracts (Prop. 39 L, 2014-2015). The 
legislation is aimed at newly educated and young workers, but might also have consequences 
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for the generations of older workers. As mentioned above it is the same group who have the 
highest probability of both leaving and changing work. If the regulations on temporary 
employment are changed, many of those who change jobs later in their working career might 
only get temporary employment. It is well-established in the literature that firms are reluctant 
to hire older workers (Hek and Vuuren, 2011, Hutchens, 1986, Daniel and Heywood, 2007). 
The firms conundrum can be solved by only hiring experienced workers on short term 
contract, and thus get the gains from their high general human capital without binding the 
firm to the individual for the years where the gap between productivity and wage increase. 
The proposition itself tells that the change in legislation will increase mobility (Prop. 39 L, 
2014-2015). Already it is plausible to assume that the group with highest probability of 
changing jobs do it out of necessity rather than willingness.  
 
Robustness  
In this section I will discuss some of the models weaknesses and possible improvements. The 
largest source of error is omitted variables. When an individual choose to change jobs 
voluntarily it is very difficult to explain the reason by only using background characteristics. 
The choice to change job is probably most often founded in interest of a new topic or 
challenge. And this is very difficult to capture in a variable. It would also be interesting to 
control for eventual involuntary job change, and who this affect.  This is easier to register.  
 
Another variable that probably have strong impact is job availability in near geographical 
distance to the individuals’ home. This can be replaced with a measure of geographic 
centrality, since most cities usually have a larger job market and as a consequence more 
turnover. The size of the firm, where the individual work can probably also affect the results, 
since big firms often have more turnover than smaller firms. Firm specific tenure would also 
interesting to include, to give better understanding of how much tenure affect job change.  
 
And last, but not least; the analysis lack a health variable. Knowing the individuals health 
condition would be most useful when analysing exit from the workforce. Without a measure 
on health, it is impossible to draw any conclusion about causality.  
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Further research 
There is great need for, and many possibilities for further research on job-to-job mobility in 
Norway. First of all it would be interesting to compare job changes in establishments to the 
changes in enterprise. If the level of change between establishments stays high or decrease 
less than job changes between enterprises, it can indicate that contracts and pension 
agreements with the specific enterprise is the reason for not changing position.  
 
There are also many ways to improve the analysis by including more information. Especially 
all the variables listed as omitted in the previous section. Involuntary job change, job 
availability, geographic centrality, size of firm and tenure are possible to attain without too 
much difficulty. There have also been derived several different methods for measuring health. 
Reasons for job change is probably the most difficult variable to measure, but it is possible to 
get an indication through use of surveys.  
 
Another interesting extension to the analysis is to look at the data as a panel and test for time 
effect. It would be advantageous to control for economic fluctuations, which probably have 
strong connections to the level of job change.  
 
 
For future policy changes to be effective more research is needed to give a better 
understanding of the senior workers’ labour market mobility. 
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Appendix A 
A. Structuring the employee/employment register for this analysis  
The FD-trygd database contains several datasets on employment. The datasets include 
different information related to employment, storing the available details in different formats. 
I need information form two separate datasets named F and TAB, and some structural changes 
are needed to manage merging information from the two. 
 
The main dataset in the employer/employee data register is named F and contain information 
on each job spell, more accurately when the job spell starts, stops and any changes.  
Unfortunately F does not contain all the information we need to study job change, but this 
information can be found in one of the other registers named TAB. Merging these two 
together and then with the rest of the sample created some issues, because the two registers 
and the sample are all constructed very differently. This next section will explain the process 
and the choices we made when completing this sample. I will start by describing the F and 
TAB register respectively and then how they are merged together to best fit with the rest of 
the sample. I will also use graphical supplements for better explanation.   
 
The F register contains complete historical information on every “job spell” sorted by 
individuals. A job spell is represented with a serial number connected to the individual 
number, and can be explained as each position an individual hold. The number will always 
change when a job change occurs either between establishment, enterprise or both, but it will 
also change when an individual get a new position within an establishment. Other registration 
issues may also trigger a change in job spell.  
 
Table 9: Coding of the F register 
Individual 
number 
Job spell 
serial 
number 
1 Start date of job spell 
2 Change in job spell 
0 End date of job spell 
3 
Start date before 2003 (automatically set to 
1st Jan 2003) 
 
One individual can have several job spells the same year, representing the different jobs an 
individual might hold. An individual can also have several records on one job spell within one 
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year, for example starting and quitting a job within a year. This can also happen periodically 
since many have seasonal depending jobs.  Since the register only make records when a job 
spell change, an individual can be represented with only one record for all the observed years, 
indicating holding one job spell without changing it the whole period we observe them.  
 
The TAB register is also sorted on individual number and the serial number for job spell. The 
TAB register is based in yearly information and will have one record for each year observed 
as long as the individual is registered with a job. It is from this register we get most of the 
information we want to study like the enterprise number (changes in which will be the one of 
the dependent variables), sector, and municipality.  
 
The first figure shows an example individual and how this person’s work information is 
recorded in the F and TAB register. Each circle represents one record (observation), the 
colours differentiating the job spells within the time frame from 2003-2008. The numbers 
within the circles in F show what kind of record we have as given by Table 13. 
 
Figure 20: Graphical illustration of the F and TAB register layout 
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The figure above is a good example of a “messy” record. The measures taken to simplify the 
sample are illustrated in the next figure. The encircled observations are all within the same 
enterprise, and are therefore merged into one. The crossed out observations is removed 
because of short duration.  
 
The F and TAB register is merged using the job spell serial number, the result after the 
merging is a bit messy and further measures to simplify the sample were implemented:  
 If an individual is registered starting a job spell less than 60 days after ending a job within 
the same enterprise, the records are merged to one job spell.  
 Every job spell with duration less than 360 days is removed.  
 Every job spell with less than an average of 16 work hours (2 days) per week is removed.  
 Last but not least, the sample is restructured to get only one observation per job spell per 
year.  
 
Figure 21: Graphical illustration of the sample simplification  
 
 
Figure 22: Final result after reconstruction 
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Appendix B 
B. Activity status in the workforce by education and age  
 
Overviews of activity status depending on highest completed education for the individuals in 
the sample are presented in the three figures below. A glance at the figures show that the 
share leaving early for disability benefit is decrease with more years of schooling, which 
support the theory that education level is correlated with the probability of leaving early. In 
2013 there was 710 645 people between 55-66 years living in Norway (Statistisk Sentralbyrå, 
2014b), of these 480 708 (67,7 per cent) people were registered employed (Statistisk 
Sentralbyrå, 2014c), which means that over 200 000 is already out of the workforce before the 
standard (voluntary) retirement age at 67. 
 
Figure 23: Activity status for individuals with Mandatory primary school as highest achieved education, 
by gender. Per cent 
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Figure 24: Activity status for individuals with Upper secondary school as highest achieved education, by 
gender. Per cent 
 
 
 
Figure 25: Activity status for individuals higher education, by gender. Per cent 
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Appendix C 
C. Sector overview 
Identification 
number Original sector classification (Statistics Norway) 
Classification used 
in this thesis 
110 Government 
Government 150 Central bank 
190 Governmental loan institutions 
210 Bank 
Private financial 
institutions 
250 Bank 
310 Credit company 
370 Investment firms 
380 Equity firms 
390 
Other financial institutions 
391 
410 Life insurance  
470 General insurance 
490 Financial auxiliaries 
510 County County 
550 Municipality 
Municipality 
610 Public administration companies 
630 
Governmental enterprises Government 
635 
660 
Municipality enterprises Municipality 
680 
710 Private enterprises 
Private 
740 Private No profit production organizations 
760 Personal enterprises 
770 Private No profit consumption organizations 
790 Self-employed  
810 earners in retirement, on benefits or students 
890 Other 
900 Foreign sector 
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Appendix D 
D. Correlation tables 
 
 
Table 10: Correlation table, nonemployment 
Nonemployment Education Married  
Nr.years 
income>B.a. 
High 
income Age County 
  
      Education 1.0000 
     Married  0.0386 1.0000 
    Nr.years income>B.a. -0.0556 0.0396 1.0000 
   High income 0.3145 0.0620 0.1359 1.0000 
  Age -0.0067 0.0720 0.4475 -0.0443 1.0000 
 County -0.0436 0.0277 -0.0364 -0.0900 -0.0256 1.0000 
 
 
 
 
Table 11: Correlation table, job change 
Job change Education Married  
Nr.years 
income>B.a. 
High 
income Age County 
  
      Education 1.0000 
     Married  0.0401 1.0000 
    Nr.years income>B.a. -0.0519 0.0323 1.0000 
   High income 0.3060 0.0638 0.1351 1.0000 
  Age -0.0090 0.0664 0.3965 -0.0279 1.0000 
 County -0.0518 0.0259 -0.0305 -0.0942 -0.0250 1.0000 
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Appendix E 
E. Regression tables and figures  
I. Nonemployment 
 
Table 12: County coefficients, extension to Table 6 
  Low education High education 
VARIABLES Men se Women se Men se Women se 
Ostfold 0.0302*** (0.0038) 0.0061 (0.0047) 0.0179*** (0.0052) 0.0140** (0.0061) 
Akershus -0.0084** (0.0035) -0.0117*** (0.0042) 0.0042 (0.0040) 0.0192*** (0.0047) 
Hedemark 0.0069 (0.0043) -0.0051 (0.0051) 0.0077 (0.0059) 0.0141** (0.0066) 
Oppland 0.0060 (0.0044) -0.0227*** (0.0052) 0.0144** (0.0057) 0.0074 (0.0066) 
Buskerud -0.0071* (0.0040) -0.0292*** (0.0048) 0.0049 (0.0052) 0.0088 (0.0061) 
Vestfold -0.0134*** (0.0044) -0.0244*** (0.0053) -0.0002 (0.0054) 0.0039 (0.0063) 
Telemark 0.0246*** (0.0044) -0.0092* (0.0055) 0.0229*** (0.0058) 0.0161** (0.0066) 
Ost-Agder -0.0181*** (0.0061) -0.0525*** (0.0075) 0.0075 (0.0070) -0.0018 (0.0083) 
Vest-Agder 0.0019 (0.0048) -0.0272*** (0.0060) 0.0099* (0.0057) 0.0053 (0.0068) 
Rogaland 0.0089*** (0.0034) -0.0112*** (0.0042) 0.0197*** (0.0043) 0.0125** (0.0052) 
Hordaland -0.0178*** (0.0033) -0.0305*** (0.0040) 0.0028 (0.0040) -0.0079 (0.0050) 
Sogn og Fjordane -0.0051 (0.0053) -0.0276*** (0.0062) 0.0052 (0.0070) -0.0024 (0.0084) 
More of Romsdal -0.0182*** (0.0039) -0.0361*** (0.0047) 0.0042 (0.0049) -0.0150** (0.0061) 
Sor-Trondelag 0.0009 (0.0038) 0.0145*** (0.0045) 0.0102** (0.0044) 0.0243*** (0.0055) 
Nord-Trondelag -0.0072 (0.0050) -0.0090 (0.0059) 0.0024 (0.0066) 0.0028 (0.0072) 
Nordland 0.0152*** (0.0040) 0.0231*** (0.0047) 0.0257*** (0.0052) 0.0371*** (0.0062) 
Troms 0.0073 (0.0049) 0.0256*** (0.0056) 0.0150** (0.0061) 0.0386*** (0.0071) 
Finnmark 0.0040 (0.0071) 0.0205** (0.0081) 0.0262*** (0.0100) 0.0356*** (0.0104) 
Standard errors in parentheses             
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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II. Job change 
Table 13: Estimated probability of job change by gender and education, marginal effects 
  Low education High education 
VARIABLES Men se Women se Men se Women se 
Married -0.0052*** (0.0014) -0.0238*** (0.0013) -0.0071*** (0.0021) -0.0264*** (0.0019) 
Nr.years income>B.a. -0.0045*** (0.0002) -0.0010*** (0.0001) 0.0006* (0.0003) -0.0025*** (0.0002) 
High income -0.0160*** (0.0016) -0.0095*** (0.0031) -0.0047** (0.0020) 0.0005 (0.0025) 
Government -0.0111*** (0.0026) -0.0386*** (0.0019) -0.0372*** (0.0025) -0.0470*** (0.0023) 
Private finance -0.0952*** (0.0056) -0.0795*** (0.0039) -0.0590*** (0.0058) -0.0434*** (0.0081) 
County -0.1244*** (0.0110) -0.1352*** (0.0068) -0.1958*** (0.0060) -0.1131*** (0.0049) 
Municipality -0.0656*** (0.0024) -0.1321*** (0.0019) -0.0940*** (0.0030) -0.0983*** (0.0024) 
Governmental 
enterprises -0.0306*** (0.0029) -0.0380*** (0.0034) -0.0030 (0.0037) -0.0132** (0.0062) 
Ostfold -0.0413*** (0.0036) -0.0469*** (0.0033) -0.0263*** (0.0056) -0.0244*** (0.0053) 
Akershus 0.0098*** (0.0027) 0.0021 (0.0024) 0.0089*** (0.0032) 0.0119*** (0.0032) 
Hedemark -0.0360*** (0.0039) -0.0591*** (0.0038) -0.0145** (0.0059) -0.0091* (0.0054) 
Oppland -0.0305*** (0.0040) -0.0431*** (0.0037) -0.0107* (0.0059) -0.0023 (0.0053) 
Buskerud -0.0229*** (0.0035) -0.0105*** (0.0029) -0.0132*** (0.0049) 0.0048 (0.0045) 
Vestfold -0.0133*** (0.0036) -0.0406*** (0.0035) -0.0233*** (0.0053) -0.0184*** (0.0050) 
Telemark -0.0080** (0.0039) -0.0451*** (0.0039) -0.0078 (0.0055) -0.0202*** (0.0057) 
Ost-Agder -0.0050 (0.0049) -0.0407*** (0.0051) -0.0127* (0.0073) -0.0397*** (0.0079) 
Vest-Agder -0.0199*** (0.0042) -0.0432*** (0.0043) -0.0292*** (0.0060) -0.0390*** (0.0064) 
Rogaland -0.0020 (0.0028) -0.0278*** (0.0027) -0.0139*** (0.0038) -0.0128*** (0.0039) 
Hordaland -0.0142*** (0.0027) -0.0316*** (0.0025) -0.0114*** (0.0035) -0.0265*** (0.0037) 
Sogn og Fjordane -0.0393*** (0.0050) -0.0458*** (0.0048) -0.0415*** (0.0082) -0.0224*** (0.0077) 
More of Romsdal -0.0071** (0.0031) -0.0458*** (0.0032) -0.0307*** (0.0051) -0.0239*** (0.0051) 
Sor-Trondelag -0.0340*** (0.0034) -0.0389*** (0.0031) -0.0396*** (0.0044) -0.0406*** (0.0046) 
Nord-Trondelag -0.0556*** (0.0048) -0.0707*** (0.0050) -0.0417*** (0.0076) -0.0543*** (0.0077) 
Nordland -0.0094*** (0.0033) -0.0344*** (0.0034) -0.0094* (0.0050) 0.0069 (0.0046) 
Troms 0.0068* (0.0038) -0.0182*** (0.0038) -0.0006 (0.0056) 0.0161*** (0.0049) 
Finnmark -0.0060 (0.0054) -0.0237*** (0.0057) -0.0075 (0.0090) 0.0283*** (0.0067) 
50 -0.0466*** (0.0028) -0.0283*** (0.0026) -0.0372*** (0.0039) -0.0313*** (0.0034) 
52 0.0198*** (0.0030) 0.0167*** (0.0028) 0.0116*** (0.0041) 0.0144*** (0.0036) 
53 0.0361*** (0.0030) 0.0204*** (0.0028) 0.0226*** (0.0042) 0.0238*** (0.0037) 
54 0.0422*** (0.0031) 0.0216*** (0.0029) 0.0188*** (0.0044) 0.0226*** (0.0039) 
55 0.0365*** (0.0032) 0.0206*** (0.0029) 0.0166*** (0.0044) 0.0185*** (0.0041) 
56 0.0311*** (0.0033) 0.0110*** (0.0030) 0.0074 (0.0047) 0.0087** (0.0043) 
57 0.0343*** (0.0034) 0.0009 (0.0031) -0.0043 (0.0048) 0.0043 (0.0046) 
58 0.0201*** (0.0035) -0.0036 (0.0032) -0.0112** (0.0050) -0.0048 (0.0048) 
59 0.0050 (0.0037) -0.0150*** (0.0033) -0.0302*** (0.0053) -0.0161*** (0.0052) 
60 -0.0053 (0.0038) -0.0321*** (0.0035) -0.0423*** (0.0056) -0.0305*** (0.0056) 
61 -0.0621*** (0.0041) -0.0709*** (0.0038) -0.0881*** (0.0061) -0.0706*** (0.0065) 
62 -0.0489*** (0.0047) -0.0680*** (0.0045) -0.0725*** (0.0066) -0.0564*** (0.0073) 
63 -0.0653*** (0.0056) -0.0802*** (0.0054) -0.1105*** (0.0081) -0.0709*** (0.0092) 
64 -0.0881*** (0.0065) -0.0981*** (0.0063) -0.1089*** (0.0086) -0.0718*** (0.0102) 
65 -0.0912*** (0.0072) -0.1063*** (0.0072) -0.1155*** (0.0097) -0.0763*** (0.0117) 
66 -0.1783*** (0.0092) -0.1589*** (0.0087) -0.1847*** (0.0117) -0.1318*** (0.0157) 
67 -0.1255*** (0.0224) -0.0966*** (0.0213) -0.1298*** (0.0220) -0.1188*** (0.0402) 
68 -0.3367*** (0.0991) -0.2150** (0.1034) -0.1899*** (0.0422) -0.1559 (0.0972) 
R2 0,0223   0,0408   0,0606   0,0533 
 Observations 319,842   258,668   144,934   116,983   
 
